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Wrongful birth' is an action sounding in tort2 brought by
the parents of an unplanned child against a physician who per-
forms an unsuccessful sterilization operation or abortion, or
who improperly diagnoses the fact of pregnancy or the physical
1. Wrongful birth actions must be distinguished from actions for wrongful life.
A suit for wrongful life is brought by parents on behalf of the child himself to re-
cover damages for having been allowed to be born. For example, in Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979), a Downs syndrome child alleged that had the defen-
dant informed her mother of the availability of amniocentesis, and performed that
test, her mother would have terminated the pregnancy and she would never have
come into existence.
Wrongful life actions have not met with favor in the courts. The reason most
frequently offered for denying the claim is the impossibility of calculating dam-
ages. Since the purpose in awarding damages is compensation, the child bringing
the wrongful life action is actually demanding the court to measure the difference
between the value of his existence (caused by the negligence) and that of his nonex-
istence (that is, his value if the negligent act had not occurred). The courts have
responded that the value of life as opposed to nonlife is incapable of measurement.
See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
Only three states recognize a cause of action for wrongful life: California, New
Jersey and Washington. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(Ct. App. 1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
For a discussion of wrongful life, see Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141
(2005); David D. Wilmoth, Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of
Action - Suggestions For a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 612-21
(1980).
2. Actions for wrongful birth have also sounded in contract and warranty.
See, e.g., Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201
(Wash. 1964) (parents brought suit alleging that the physician breached his im-
plied warranty in failing to render the father sterile). These suits are usually un-
successful because courts will dismiss the action unless the plaintiff can prove
separate consideration for the fee for the sterilization operation. See, e.g., Clegg v.
Chase, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977); but see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967) (court infers that through physician's failure to warn the
patient of the possibility of failure of treatment, he guaranteed success without
qualifications).
Because of the prevalence of suits brought in tort for negligence, and their rate
of success, this Article will deal only with that cause of action for wrongful. birth.
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condition of the fetus during pregnancy. 3 The plaintiffs com-
plaint typically alleges that the physician's negligence caused
the parents to suffer the conception or birth of the child.4 The
parents of the wrongfully born infant pray for compensation for
the losses they have sustained as a result of the birth.
Originally, claims for wrongful birth were categorically de-
nied. 5 In the first wrongful birth suit, Christensen v. Thornby,6
the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the parents' claim, main-
taining that the birth of any child was a "blessed event."7
Twenty-three years later, a Pennsylvania court, in Shaheen v.
Knight," reasoned that since procreation was the chief purpose
of marriage, it could not sustain the married plaintiffs action
for wrongful birth.9 Thus, adherence to these deeply-rooted
sentiments grounded in public policy caused the injured parents
of an unwanted child to be deprived of a legal remedy.
Three decades after the first wrongful birth case was de-
cided, it became apparent that a shift in this once pervasive so-
cial policy was emerging. 10 This transition was evidenced by
3. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (unsuccessful
vasectomy); Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (unsuccessful tubal
ligation).
One court has also allowed parents of an unplanned child to bring an action
for wrongful birth against a pharmacist who negligently substituted a tranquilizer
while filling a prescription for an oral contraceptive. See Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442
A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982) (physician's negligent performance of sterilization of plain-
tiff mother caused her to give birth to unplanned child); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (physician's negligent performance of sterilization on
plaintiff father caused plaintiffs to parent an unwanted child); Speck v. Finegold,
439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1982) (physicans' negligent performance of both sterilization and
abortion procedures caused parents to give birth to a genetically defective child);
Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d. 825 (Va. 1982) (physician's negligent diagnosis of
parents' hereditary disease caused parents to forego abortion of affected child).
5. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934); Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
6. 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934).
7. Id.
8. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964). Although the Wash-
ington court denied the parents' claim for summary judgment in a wrongful birth
action, it opined, "[our holding for the physician] should not be construed as an
expression of opinion by this court on [physician's] contention that the case should
... have been resolved in his favor as a matter of law." Id. at 203.
3
244 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:241
two United States Supreme Court cases. In 1965, the Court, in
Griswold v. Connecticut," held that the decision of a man and
woman to procreate or use some form of birth control fell within
their constitutionally protected right to privacy. 12 Eight years
later, in Roe v. Wade,' 3 the Court extended this protection to a
woman's decision to abort a fetus within the first trimester of
pregnancy.' 4 Having been afforded these new constitutional
protections, parents were secured against having their claims
for wrongful birth denied based on the policy arguments ad-
vanced by the courts in Christensen and Shaheen. As a result of
Griswold and Roe, parties claiming injury as a result of wrong-
ful birth should no longer be denied a remedy at law.' 5
The rationale of the Griswold case contradicts the policy
reasons advanced in Shaheen for denying a cause of action for
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. The Griswold court reasoned, inter alia, that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. [Those] [viarious guarantees create zones of
privacy." Id. at 484. After discussing the specific amendments to the Constitution
that give rise to this right of privacy, the Court stated that the intimate relation of
husband and wife is one lying within that zone of privacy. Id. at 486. It concluded
that a law which forbids the "use of contraceptives ... [has] a maximum destruc-
tive impact upon that relationship" and cannot be upheld. Id. at 485.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. The Roe court introduced the issue by recognizing "the sensitive and emo-
tional nature of the abortion controversy.., and of the deep and seemingly abso-
lute convictions that the subject inspires." Id. at 116. It continued:
One's philosophy, one's experiences . . .one's religious training, one's atti-
tudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion... Our task, of course, is to resolve
the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection.
Id. Realizing that the Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to privacy,
the court cited Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, as having established one and maintained
that "[tihis right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153 (the remainder of the
court's opinion deals with the competing interests of the woman and the state re-
garding the lawfulness of abortion during the three trimesters of pregnancy). For
a full discussion and analysis of the Roe decision and its subsequent impact, see
Philip Heymann & Douglas Barzelay, The Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973).
15. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. In adopting the
right of privacy and applying it to contraception and abortion, the Supreme Court
did not discuss, nor did it intimate the relevance of its decision to the action for
wrongful birth.
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wrongful birth. In recognizing a couple's right to use contracep-
tion, the Court abrogated, as a matter of constitutional law, the
concept that procreation is the chief purpose of marriage. Fur-
thermore, in its holding in Roe, the Court, at least impliedly,
recognized that not all women believe that the birth of a child is
a "blessed event." It follows, therefore, that the "blessing" doc-
trine of Christensen can no longer be maintained as a per se
rule.
Since the early 1970's, claims for wrongful birth have met
with increasing success in the state courts.16 The litigation has
16. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of
rubella syndrome child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negli-
gently failed to diagnose mother's rubella and inform her of possible damages to
the fetus, and received damages for the costs of raising and supporting the child);
Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1982) (mother of unplanned child
brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently performed a
laproscopic cauterization and was denied recovery for the costs of raising healthy
child); Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(mother of unplanned, healthy child, brought wrongful birth action against physi-
cian who negligently performed tubal ligation and was denied rearing costs); Wil-
liams v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1997) (parents sought
damages for the birth of their child following a failed tubal ligation); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (parents brought action against phy-
sician who negligently performed abortion and were precluded from recovering
damages for costs incurred in raising and educating the child); Maggard v. McKel-
vey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy child
brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of va-
sectomy on father and were denied costs for rearing the child); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (benefits of an unwanted, healthy, child may be
weighed against all elements of damage claims by plaintiffs who had unplanned
child as a result of pharmacist's negligently supplying tranquilizer rather than
birth control pill); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (par-
ents of wrongfully born, healthy child, brought action against physician who negli-
gently performed sterilization operation and were awarded damages for the
prenatal and postnatal expenses, mother's pain and suffering during pregnancy
and delivery, loss of consortium and reasonable cost of rearing the unplanned child
subject to offset by the value of child's aid, comfort and society); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (parents of healthy child
brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligence in performing a
sterilization operation on mother and recovered damages for emotional upset,
physical inconvenience and costs incurred in rearing the child offset by any bene-
fits that they might receive as a result of the child's birth); Ziemba v. Sternberg,
357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (App. Div. 1974) (action in malpractice lies by parents against
physician for his negligent failure to diagnose a pregnancy so that mother was
prevented from aborting the child); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I.
1997); Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169 (Ohio 2000); Bowman v. Davis, 356
N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (parents of healthy child born as result of physician's negli-
gent performance of tubal ligation brought suit and recovered costs for rearing);
5
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arisen from a variety of factual situations. Many of the success-
ful actions have been brought by parents alleging that the phy-
sician's negligence prior to the conception of their child caused
the injury.' 7 For instance, physicians have been held liable for
incorrectly performing a vasectomy 8 or tubal ligation.' 9 The ac-
tion may also arise after a child has been conceived. Claims
have been brought against physicians for failing to diagnose a
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (suit for recovery of expenses rea-
sonably necessary for care and treatment of child who was born physically im-
paired because of mother's having contracted rubella is not barred by
considerations of public policy); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372
(Wis. 1975) (parents of child born with rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth
action against physician for negligently failing to diagnose mother's condition and
warn her of probable effects on fetus, and recovered damages limited to expenses
which parents had reasonably and necessarily suffered and would suffer in the
future due to the child's deformities).
17. In this type of situation, the claims have often been entitled "Wrongful
conception" or "wrongful pregnancy" by the courts. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). Some commentators believe that
the distinction in nomenclature is vital to a proper assessment of the issues in-
volved. See, e.g., Lisa A. Podewils, Traditional Tort Principles and Wrongful Con-
ception Child-Rearing Damages, 73 B.U. L. REV. 407, 407 n.2 (May 1993)
("Wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy lawsuits may be distinguished from
wrongful birth . . . actions. In wrongful birth lawsuits, the parents of unhealthy
infants seek to recover the cost of caring for the disabled infant. Recovery is based
on the premise that the parents would have aborted if they had known that the
child was going to be disabled, or that the child's impairment was caused by the
physician's negligence .... "); Diane M. Vogt, Note, Torts-Cause of Action Recog-
nized for Wrongful Pregnancy-Measure of Damages to be Applied, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 961 (March 1979). Because the underlying issue involves ordinary common
law negligence, the distinction is of little or no value. It serves only to identify the
temporary quality of the negligence and is not relevant to a disposition of the un-
derlying issue. As Dean Prosser has espoused, the particular name a tort bears is
of little relevance to the real issue of whether "the plaintiffs interests are entitled
to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant." WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER
& W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 4 (5th ed., West 1984).
Additionally, unlike the characterization given to the different nomenclature
by Podewils, causes of action based on the concept of wrongful birth of a child born
healthy, are abundant. See sources cited infra notes 101-34 and accompanying
text.
18. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). A
vasectomy is a sterilization procedure performed on a man, by which a section of
the vas deferens, a tube which carries spermatoza, is cut, and the severed ends
sutured, thus preventing escape of sperm to a point where a male may impregnate
the female.
19. See, e.g., Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976). A tubal ligation
is a sterilization procedure by which a woman's fallopian tubes are cut and tied off
as a means of preventing the union of sperm and egg.
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pregnancy or for failing to test for, or diagnose, fetal defects in
time for the mother to obtain a legal abortion.20
The spectrum of damages that have been claimed, awarded
or denied is even broader than that of the various forms of
wrongful birth actions.21 Every court that has heard a wrongful
birth claim has discussed the multiple elements of possible
damage and the controversy over the proper calculation of dam-
ages. 22 Although courts often purport to allow recovery for
those elements of damages that are a direct and probable result
of the defendant physician's negligence, 23 in actuality, most
awards are not that far-reaching. 24 The most controversial
20. See, e.g., Rieck v. Med. Protective Co. 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
21. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 24.
22. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of
rubella syndrome child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negli-
gently failed to diagnose mother's rubella and inform her of possible dangers to the
fetus, and received damages for the costs of raising and supporting the child);
Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy
child brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of
vasectomy on father and were denied costs of rearing the child); Moores v. Lucas,
405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of deformed child brought ac-
tion against physician based on negligent failure to diagnose and warn of inherita-
ble disease and recovered damages for medical expenses and extraordinary care
involved in treatment of child); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1981) (parents of child wrongfully born as a result of negligent sterilization
allowed to recover full costs of raising and educating unplanned child); Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy child
brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of va-
sectomy on father and were denied the costs of rearing the child); Eisbrenner v.
Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of child born with genetic
defect were entitled to seek damages for both medical expenses and mental dis-
tress from physician who negligently failed to inform plaintiffs of fetus' condition
at stage where abortion was legal); Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div.
1980) (parents of wrongfully born, healthy child can recover medical expenses as
well as pain and suffering from physician or negligently performed vasectomy, but
costs for rearing denied as speculative and beyond reasonable measurement).
23. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Ochs v.
Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H.
1982); sources cited infra notes 101-13, 135-50 and accompanying text.
24. Costs arising from the unsuccessful medical procedure and from the birth
itself are most frequently awarded. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark.
1982) and sources cited infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text; Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003
(N.H. 1982) and sources cited infra notes 101-13. In addition, damages for pain
and suffering connected with the pregnancy, see Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460
(S.D. W. Va. 1967); loss of the mother's wages due to the pregnancy. see id. For the
father's loss of consortium during the wife's absence have also been allowed, see,
7
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question concerning damages is whether to award the injured
parents costs of raising the unwanted child. 25 In determining
the extent of the parents' injury, courts have focused on the
health of the wrongfully born child. When the child is born dis-
eased or with an abnormality, courts have shown an increasing
willingness to award the plaintiff parents full compensation for
the financial loss they will suffer for raising a physically or
mentally challenged child.26 However, in cases arising from the
unplanned birth of a healthy child, courts generally have re-
fused to recognize the full costs of rearing as a proper element of
damages.27
Entering its adolescence as a cause of action, the wrongful
birth claims' validity was recognized by an increasing number
of courts.28 The courts were generally unable to dismiss the
e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis,
356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976). One court has held that the parents of a child born
with birth defects have a valid claim for damages resulting from emotional injury
sustained as a result of the birth. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979)
(mental and emotional anguish parents have suffered and will continue to suffer
as the result of their Downs syndrome child is an appropriate measure of damage).
25. See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(the principal controversy in negligent birth control actions revolves around the
damage question).
26. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Speck v. Finegold,
439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1982); sources cited infra notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (public policy bars
the awarding of damages for rearing); Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (cost of raising a previously unwanted but healthy, nor-
mal child is not a recoverable element in wrongful birth cases); Kingsbury v.
Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982) (no damages awarded for rearing); but see, e.g.,
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (costs of raising and
educating an unplanned child are a proper element of damages and rewards of
parenthood that should not be allowed in mitigation of rearing costs); Bowman v.
Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (recovery for expense due to change in family
status and economic costs of rearing is not against public policy).
28. Successful wrongful birth cases since 1967 include: Robak v. United
States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of rubella syndrome child brought
wrongful birth action against physician who negligently failed to diagnose
mother's rubella and inform her of possible damages to the fetus, and received
damages for the costs of raising and supporting the child); Hartke v. McKelway,
526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981) (mother of unplanned child brought wrongful birth
action against physician who negligently performed a laparoscopic cauterization
and was denied recovery for the costs of raising a healthy child); Bishop v. Byrne,
265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (in an action brought by parents of child born
as result of negligently performed sterilization, whether wife suffered mental or
physical pain from pregnancy and subsequent Caesarean section presented dis-
puted issues of fact which precluded grant of summary judgment); Wilbur v. Kerr,
248
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/3
2007] WRONGFUL BIRTH 249
628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (parents of an unwanted, healthy child brought suit
against physician who negligently and unsuccessfully performed vasectomy on fa-
ther and were denied rearing costs on the basis of public policy); Custodio v. Bauer,
59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967) (in action to recover damages for the birth of a
normal, healthy child following failure of sterilization procedure, plaintiffs entitled
to recover more than nominal damages); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn.
1982) (parents of unplanned, healthy child, recovered costs of rearing offset by
value of child's aid and comfort from physician who negligently performed a tubal
ligation); Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(mother of unplanned, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physi-
cian who negligently performed tubal ligation and was denied rearing costs); Mag-
gard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of unwanted,
healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent per-
formance of vasectomy on father and were denied costs for rearing); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (parents brought action against phy-
sician who negligently performed abortion and were precluded from recovering
damages for costs incurred in raising and educating the child); Sherlock v. Stillwa-
ter Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (parents of wrongfully born, healthy, child
brought action against physician who negligently performed sterilization operation
and were awarded damages for the prenatal and postnatal expenses, mother's pain
and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, loss of consortium and reasonable
cost of rearing the unplanned child subject to offset by the value of child's aid,
comfort and society); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (bene-
fits of an unwanted, healthy, child may be weighed against all elements of damage
claimed by plaintiffs who had unplanned child as result of pharmacist's negli-
gently supplying tranquilizer rather than birth control pill); Kingsbury v. Smith,
442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982) (parents of healthy child wrongfully born after negli-
gent vasectomy recovered damages from defendant physician for hospital and
medical expenses, cost of sterilization, pain and suffering, loss of mother's wages
and father's consortium, but were denied costs for rearing); Betancourt v. Gaylor,
344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (parents of healthy child brought
wrongful birth action against physician for negligence in performing a sterilization
operation on mother and recovered damages for emotional upset, physical inconve-
nience and costs incurred in rearing the child offset by any benefits that they
might receive as a result of the child's birth); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d
265 (App. Div. 1974) (action in malpractice lies by parents against physician for his
negligent failure to diagnose a pregnancy so that mother was prevented from
aborting the child); Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (parents of
healthy child born as result of physician's negligent performance of tubal ligation
recovered costs for rearing); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981) (parents of
a genetically defective child brought action against physicians who negligently per-
formed vasectomy and abortion procedures and were awarded damages for ex-
penses attributable to the birth and rearing of the child, mental distress and
physical inconvenience attributable to the child's birth); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (suit for recovery of expenses reasonably necessary for care
and treatment of child who was born physically impaired because of mother's hav-
ing contracted rubella is not barred by considerations of public policy); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982) (parents of child born with Tay-Sach's disease
brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently failed to discover
that fetus was affected with the disease, causing mother to forego abortion, and
recovered damages for care and treatment of child, and emotional distress); Dumer
9
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suits on the grounds of public policy because of the decisions in
Griswold and Roe. 29 However, in their lingering reluctance to
recognize wrongful birth as a typical negligence action, the
courts continued to deny claimants complete recovery for the in-
juries they suffered. In doing so, the courts left the parents of
unwanted children with an incomplete remedy and an echo of
the resounding admonition of Christensen ringing in their ear-
instead of suffering an injury, you have been "blessed with the
fatherhood of another child."30
This article will trace the evolution of the cause of action for
wrongful birth. It will then study five successful wrongful birth
cases handed down by state courts of last resort during a semi-
nal year in the tort's development.31 The stunted development
of the cause of action since then, including a number of state
legislatures' enacting laws denying the availability of the tort to
the citizens of their jurisdictions, and the continued misapplica-
tion of basic principles of tort law by courts in states that do
recognize this controversial cause of action will be discussed.
The legislative history of the Pennsylvania statute abrogating
the common law action for the tort of wrongful birth for its citi-
zens will be analyzed. Finally, the holdings and rationales of
cases in the jurisdictions that do recognize the cause of action
are discussed, with an emphasis on the measure of damages. It
will be demonstrated that though many courts have recognized
the traditional tort nature of wrongful birth, through indiscrim-
inate application of basic postulates of damages' rules or under
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975) (parents of child born with
rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligently
failing to diagnose mother's condition and warn her of probable effects on fetus,
and recovered damages limited to expenses which parents had reasonably and nec-
essarily suffered and would suffer in the future due to the child's deformities). For
additional cases, see infra note 207.
29. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30. Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934). See cases cited
supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
31. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982), see sources cited infra notes
114-26 and accompanying text; Ochs v. Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982), see
sources cited infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text; Kingsbury v. Smith, 442
A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982), see sources cited infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text;
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981) (note that this case was actually
handed down on December 31, 1981), see sources cited infra notes 159-71 and ac-
companying text; Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), see sources cited
infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
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the guise of public policy, injured plaintiffs are nevertheless left
with an incomplete remedy or awarded damages beyond the
scope of the defendant's culpability.
This article concludes that although the cause of action for
wrongful birth has been denied both by some governors' pens
and the pens of some ultra-conservative courts, it remains a
valid cause of action in the majority of states. The courts that
do hear wrongful birth claims should shift the focus of their in-
quiry from the health of the wrongfully born child to the plain-
tiffs reasons for deciding not to parent a child, in order to
award a remedy that is commensurate with the extent of the
injury suffered.
I. The Genesis and Development of the Cause of Action for
Wrongful Birth: A "Blessing" Evolves into a Burden
The earliest claims for wrongful birth in the state courts
were unsuccessful. 32 In the first wrongful birth case on record,
Christensen v. Thornby,33 the Supreme Court of Minnesota was
asked to hold a physician who failed to render the plaintiff ster-
ile after a vasectomy operation responsible for costs resulting
from the plaintiffs wife's subsequent pregnancy. 34 The plaintiff
in Christensen sought sterilization because his wife had been
advised to avoid a second pregnancy after having experienced
"great difficulty with the birth of her first child."35 Recognizing
that an operation to sterilize a man whose wife may not have a
child without grave hazard to her life was consistent with public
policy, the court looked to the purpose for which the plaintiff
underwent the surgery.36 It found that the purpose of the oper-
32. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934); Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957). See also cases cited supra notes
6-9 and accompanying text.
33. 255 N.W. 620.
34. Id. at 621 (cause of action based not on medical malpractice but on deceit
in the representation by the physician to the effect that a sterilization operation
would prevent conception by the wife).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 621-22. Inquiring into the purpose for which the sterilization was
sought is a valid method of determining the existence and extent of injury in
wrongful birth actions.. Unfortunately, this method of inquiry was not employed
again in a wrongful birth suit until it was adopted by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in 1981, in Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97
(D.D.C. 1981). For a discussion of Hartke and of the importance of ascertaining the
20071
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ation was "to save the wife from the hazards to her life which
were incident to childbirth," and was not for the alleged purpose
of saving the expenses incident to pregnancy and delivery.37
The court reasoned that because the wife had survived, the hus-
band had not been injured; rather, he had been "blessed with
the fatherhood of another child."38 Furthermore, the court
maintained that the "expenses alleged [were] incident to . ..
bearing [the] child, and their avoidance [was] remote from the
avowed purpose of the operation."39
The issue of wrongful birth did not arise again (in a re-
ported case) until 1957. In Shaheen v. Knight,40 a Pennsylvania
court voiced its agreement with Christensen that sterilization
procedures were not against public policy.41 However, the
Shaheen court held that where sterilization was ineffective, no
compensable damage occurred when a healthy child was subse-
quently born. The court denied the cause of action, asserting
that "to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is
foreign to the universal public sentiment of the people. '42
Thus, at this point, there were two views on the cause of
action for wrongful birth. First, a cause of action existed, but
unless the plaintiff could prove that his purpose in seeking ster-
ilization was frustrated by the subsequent birth, then as a mat-
ter-of-law, no damages were suffered, and indeed, a benefit
accrued to the parents.43 The second position was that no cause
of action existed because the recognition of one would be con-
plaintiffs purpose in seeking sterilization when awarding damages for wrongful
birth, see sources cited infra notes 79-85, 192-94 and accompanying text.
37. Christensen, 255 N.W. at 622.
38. Id.
39. Id. (denying plaintiffs action for deceit because plaintiff failed to prove
fraudulent intent). The Minnesota court later read Christensen as standing for the
proposition that although the plaintiffs claim failed, a cause of action does exist for
an improperly performed sterilization. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. 1977); see also sources cited infra notes 63-71 and accom-
panying text.
40. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id. at 45.
43. See discussion of Christensen, sources cited supra notes 33-39 and accom-
panying text.
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trary to public policy because the birth of a child is a "blessed
event."
44
Ten years after the Shaheen case was decided, a California
appeals court declined to adopt either of the two previously rec-
ognized views on wrongful birth, and espoused a third view of
what constituted an appropriate remedy in such actions. In
Custodio v. Bauer,45 the court held that if the plaintiffs could
prove that sterilization was negligently performed, and that the
physician had breached his duty to them, they could recover all
damages proximately caused by the defendant physician's
negligence. 46
The Custodio court's departure from the persuasive author-
ity of Christensen and Shaheen must be examined in light of
two intervening United States Supreme Court cases. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut47 and Roe v. Wade,48 the Court implicitly
recognized society's changing attitude toward contraception and
abortion. In Griwsold, the Court asserted that the decision to
use contraception is one of individual conscience, "clothed in a
cloak of constitutional protection." 49 Thus, the Custodio court
had substantial support for its rejection of Shaheen's premise
that procreation was the chief purpose of marriage. 50 The Su-
preme Court's ruling in Roe clearly vitiated Christensen's ratio-
nale that the birth of a child is always a "blessed event" and
illustrated that the Custodio court was prescient. In dicta, the
Roe court maintained:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
44. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934); see also dis-
cussion of Shaheen, sources cited supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
45. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
46. Id. at 476.
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of Griswold, see sources cited supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe, see sources cited supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text.
49. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463,473 (Ct. App. 1967) (citing Griswold,
381 U.S. 479).
50. See cases cited supra notes 12, 14.
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child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.51
Therefore, the California court in Custodio had every reason not
to mimic the positions of other state courts that had already
dealt with the issue.52
In awarding damages to plaintiff parents for all foreseeable
consequences of a negligently performed sterilization, including
the costs of rearing the unplanned child, Custodio added sub-
stance to the rights recognized by the Supreme Court in Gris-
wold and Roe. 53 However, Custodio has been criticized as
representing the "extreme edge or frontier" of allowable dam-
ages in a wrongful birth action. 54 To prevent the plaintiff par-
ents from obtaining a financial windfall as a result of awarding
them costs for raising a healthy child, some courts have taken a
fourth approach to wrongful birth and completely denied that
element of damages. 55
Two years after Custodio was decided, an Illinois appeals
court, in Wilczynski v. Goodman,56 allowed plaintiff parents to
recover hospital and medical costs resulting from a negligently
performed abortion, but held that awarding costs for raising
and educating a normal, healthy child was against the legisla-
tively declared policy of favoring childbirth over abortion. 57
Other courts have proffered different justifications in reaching
that result. For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that rearing costs are not an appropriate element of damages
because such an award would exceed the negligent physician's
culpability, 58 and a Florida appeals court, in Public Health
51. 410 U.S. at 153.
52. See sources cited supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
53. Custodio suggested that other foreseeable damages included the costs of
the unsuccessful surgery, mental distress and pain and suffering. 59 Cal. Rptr. at
476.
54. Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1005 (N.H. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Med. Ctr.,
268 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
56. 391 N.E.2d 479.
57. Id. at 487. The court reasoned that since the Illinois Abortion Law of
1975, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/1 (1977), strongly condemned abortion, "[t]he exis-
tence of a normal, healthy life is an esteemed right under our laws, rather than a
compensable wrong." Id.
58. Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974).
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Trust v. Brown,59 resurrected the moribund argument of
Shaheen v. Knight,60 maintaining that "a parent cannot be said
to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal,
healthy child."61
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, was unper-
suaded that such public policy considerations could properly be
employed to deny parents of an unplanned child recovery for
wrongful birth.6 2 In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,63 the Minne-
sota court reasoned that an action for wrongful birth was ana-
lytically indistinguishable from an ordinary medical
malpractice action, and stated that, "[w]here the purpose of the
physician's actions is to prevent conception or birth, elementary
justice requires that he be held legally responsible for the conse-
quences which have in fact occurred."64 Recognizing that it is
"troublesome" to allow recovery of the costs of rearing a normal,
healthy child, the court nevertheless maintained that such costs
are "a direct financial injury to the parents."65 It maintained
that "[a]lthough public sentiment may recognize that, to the
vast majority of parents, the long-term and enduring benefits of
parenthood outweigh the economic costs of rearing a healthy
child, it would seem myopic to declare today that those benefits
exceed the costs as a matter of law."66
To effect its goal of compensating the plaintiff parents, the
Minnesota court adopted a fifth position with respect to dam-
ages for wrongful birth. The court allowed damages for rearing
the unplanned child, but offset the award by an amount equal
to the benefits conferred upon the parents as a result of the
child's birth.6 7 The court asserted that a computation of rearing
costs would include an assessment of projected expenses for
59. 388 So. 2d 1084.
60. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
61. 388 So. 2d at 1085.
62. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. The court recognized that family planning is not only an "integral as-
pect of the modern marital relationship," but that decisions such as Roe and Gris-
wold have clothed the right to limit procreation with constitutional protection. Id.
67. Id. at 176. The court did not discuss its reasons for declining to follow the
Custodio approach, but merely concluded that the position it adopted was more
"refined." Id. at 173.
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maintaining, supporting and educating the child during its mi-
nority.6 This amount would then be reduced by the value of the
benefits the parents would receive as a result of the child's aid,
comfort and society. 69 The court concluded that this procedure
should be coupled with "strict judicial scrutiny of verdicts" in
order to prevent excessive awards. 70
Six years prior to the Minnesota court's decision in Sher-
lock, a Michigan appeals court developed this reduction method
with the goal of preventing excessive awards to plaintiff par-
ents.71 In contrast to Sherlock's position, however, the Michi-
gan court in Troppi v. Scarf 2 maintained that the reduction
method itself would obviate the possibility of creating windfall
verdicts. It posited that because there was a diversity of pur-
poses for which women employ contraception, and the conse-
quences arising from negligent interference with such use vary
widely from case to case, 73 "[a] rational legal system must
award damages that correspond with these differing injuries."74
The court concluded that a system that allows parents of a
wrongfully born child to recover rearing costs, offset by the
value of benefits conferred upon them as a consequence of the
birth and life of a healthy child, would serve to accomplish that
purpose. 75
68. Id. at 176. The court noted that "[s]hould the unplanned child be born
with congenital deformities, the parental support obligation could of course extend
beyond the date that the child reaches his majority." Id. at 176 n.11.
69. Id. at 176. The court recognized that the dollar value of these benefits
would be difficult to measure, but analogized this situation to wrongful death, in
which damages for loss of aid, comfort and society are routinely awarded. Id.
70. Id. The court also mandated that all actions for wrongful birth be submit-
ted to the jury with a special verdict form with explanatory instructions, to assist
them in measuring the complex elements of damage. Id.
71. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
72. Id. The plaintiffs in Troppi brought suit against a pharmacist who negli-
gently substituted tranquilizers for birth control pills when filling the plaintiffs
prescription.
73. Id. at 518. The court offered as examples of contraceptive users the
"[ulnmarried women who seek the pleasure of sexual intercourse without the per-
ils of unwed motherhood, married women who wish to delay slightly the start of a
family in order to retain the career flexibility which many young couples treasure,
[and] married women for whom the birth of another child would pose a threat to
their own health or the financial security of their families." Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court queried:
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The Michigan court's decision in Troppi has been praised
by other courts as the most logical means to achieve an equita-
ble result when the parents seek the costs of rearing an unplan-
ned child.76 However, ten years after Troppi, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia declined to employ
that rationale. 77 In Hartke v. McKelway,78 the district court was
asked to determine whether a woman who gave birth to an un-
planned, healthy child, as the result of a negligently performed
sterilization, could recover costs for raising the child. 79 To as-
certain the extent of injury resulting from the child's birth, the
Hartke court also looked to the purpose for which the plaintiff
had sought sterilization.8 0 However, in contrast to the Troppi
court's approach, the Hartke court did not employ the reduction
method in calculating damages. Rather, it maintained that a
determination of the purpose itself should be the controlling fac-
tor in awarding damages commensurate with the injury suf-
fered.81 The court found that the plaintiff had undergone
sterilization for the purpose of avoiding possible medical com-
plications from delivering another child;8 2 it was not her pur-
[Is it not likely that an] unwed college student who becomes pregnant due to
a pharmacist's failure to fill properly her prescription for oral contraceptives
...has suffered far greater damage than the young newlywed who, al-
though her pregnancy arose from the same sort of negligence, had planned
the use of contraceptives only temporarily, say, while she and her husband
took an extended honeymoon trip?
Id. It concluded that without this reduction method, "both plaintiffs would be enti-
tled to recover substantially the same damages." Id. The court stressed that the
"trier [of fact] must have the power to evaluate the benefit according to all the
circumstances of the case presented." Id. at 519. It suggested that family size and
income, parental age and marital status were some of the factors that should be
considered "in determining the extent to which the birth of a particular child rep-
resents a benefit to his parents." Id.
76. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hosp., 366 A.2d 204 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976);
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
77. Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 104.
80. In making this determination, the court followed the analysis offered by
the Minnesota court in Christensen v. Thornby, the first wrongful birth case. See
sources cited supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. The plaintiff in Hartke
sought sterilization because she had previously suffered an ectopic pregnancy (a
pregnancy in which gestation occurs elsewhere than in the uterus) and "feared for
her life should she become pregnant again." 526 F. Supp. at 105.
81. Id. For a similar viewpoint, see Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
82. 526 F. Supp. at 105.
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pose to avoid the expenses of raising a child.83 The court held
that the defendant's "wrong against [the] plaintiff consisted
[only] in imposing the pain, suffering, and mental anguish of
pregnancy on her, not in imposing the [financial] costs of a
healthy child," and thus denied the plaintiffs claim for rearing
costs.
8 4
Hartke provides a rational method for determining dam-
ages as a function of the specific injury the parents had at-
tempted to avoid. Its approach had not been used before.8 5
Instead, other courts had concentrated on the result of the
wrongful birth, rather than on the purpose the plaintiffs sought
to protect in their decision not to bear and parent a child.
The issue that has proved determinative in this outcome-
oriented approach is the physical health of the child. When the
child is born normal and healthy, the courts have engaged in
discussions of the "blessings"86 and "benefits"87 of parenthood,
and have allowed those concepts either to abrogate the plain-
tiffs claim or reduce an award of damages for rearing.88 How-
ever, if the wrongfully born infant is born with a congenital
defect, courts have generally rejected these arguments.8 9 For
example, in 1981, in Robak v. United States,90 the parents of a
child born with rubella brought a wrongful birth action against
their physician, alleging that he had negligently failed to diag-
nose the pregnant mother's rubella and inform her of possible
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The single exception is Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn.
1934).
86. See sources cited supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See sources cited infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (par-
ents brought wrongful birth action against obstetrician for failure to diagnose or
warn of inheritable disease which resulted in birth of deformed child); Eisbrenner
v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of child born with ge-
netic defects brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently de-
prived them of information which would have led them to terminate pregnancy);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975) (parents of child born
with rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth action against physician who negli-
gently failed to diagnose mother's rubella so that she could obtain an abortion dur-
ing first trimester of pregnancy).
90. 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
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injury to the fetus.91 The parents, claiming that they would
have terminated the pregnancy had they known of the effects of
the mother's rubella, sought damages for past and future main-
tenance and care of the child.92 The court ruled that an action
for wrongful birth "is governed by ordinary tort principles."93
Since "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of tort law that a negligent
tortfeasor is liable for all damages that are the proximate result
of his negligence," 94 the court held that the plaintiffs could re-
cover damages for rearing the child, and that the award was not
subject to any reduction.95
Thus, it is apparent that wrongful birth had experienced
two separate and independent paths of development. By 1981,
the parents of a child wrongfully born with a congenital disease
were generally secure in establishing rearing costs as a proper
element of damages. 96 At the same time, however, the parents
of a child wrongfully born, normal and healthy, were more
likely to have that element of damages denied.97
II. A Seminal Year for the Blemished Adolescence of a
Maturing Tort: Continuing a Tradition of
Controversy and Confusion
Five wrongful birth cases, each of first impression, were de-
cided by state courts of last resort in 1982,98 the most important
period in the development of this controversial cause of action.
The factual scenarios presented by these cases typify those that
had been encountered by other state courts. 99 It is apparent
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 478.
94. Id. at 478.
95. Id. at 479.
96. See cases cited supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
97. See sources cited infra notes 101-34 and accompanying text.
98. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982), see sources cited infra notes
114-18 and accompanying text; Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982), see
sources cited infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text; Kingsbury v. Smith, 442
A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982), see sources cited infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text;
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981), see sources cited infra notes 159-71 and
accompanying text; Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), see sources cited
infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (phy-
sician's failure to diagnose or warn of inheritable disease caused mother to forego
abortion); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (child born as
2007] 259
19
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:241
that the courts have continued the tradition of focusing the in-
quiry in wrongful birth actions on the health of the child, rather
than inquiring into the reasons behind the plaintiffs' decision
not to parent a child. 100 The five cases of 1982 illustrate the
controversy and confusion among the courts concerning the
proper measurement of damages for wrongful birth.
A. Denial of Damages for Rearing a Healthy Child
In Kingsbury v. Smith'01 and Wilbur v. Kerr,10 2 the highest
courts of New Hampshire and Arkansas, respectively, were
asked to recognize claims for wrongful birth and award dam-
ages resulting there from. Both cases involved the birth of a
normal, healthy child following unsuccessful sterilization proce-
dures. 10 3 In determining that the plaintiff parents had stated a
cause of action, both courts adopted rationales previously es-
poused by other state courts that had dealt with the issue of
wrongful birth. 0 4
In Kingsbury v. Smith, the defendant, Dr. Thompson, per-
formed a tubal ligation on the plaintiff mother, Mrs. Kingsbury,
after she gave birth to her third child. Eighteen months follow-
ing that surgery, Mrs. Kingsbury gave birth to her fourth
healthy child. In response to this unplanned birth, the King-
sburys' filed a wrongful birth action against the defendant. 05
a result of negligently performed bilateral vasectomy); Pierce v. Piver, 262 S.E.2d
320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (child born after negligent performance of a tubal
ligation).
100. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982). "The ruling
today is limited to the facts of this case, involving a faulty sterilization procedure
that resulted in the birth of a healthy child. Other and differing circumstances,
including but not limited to the birth of an abnormal or injured child, might lead
us to a different conclusion." Id. at 1006.
101. 442 A.2d 1003.
102. 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982).
103. In Kingsbury, the plaintiff mother had undergone surgery for a tubal li-
gation. 442 A.2d at 1004. In Wilbur, the plaintiff father suffered two unsuccessful
vasectomies. 628 S.W.2d at 569.
104. See sources cited supra notes 101-03 and sources cited infra notes 105-14
for the approach taken by the Kingsbury court; see sources cited infra notes 114-
126 for that taken by the Wilbur court.
105. Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1004. After the birth of her fourth child, Dr.
Thompson was again requested to undertake further sterilization procedures and
did so. The parents then filed this, diversity action in the United States District
Court of New Hampshire. This case came to the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire from a certification of questions concerning whether New Hampshire recog-
260
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire construed this ac-
tion for wrongful birth as an action for wrongful conception. 10 6
The court recognized, implicitly, that the case presented a cause
of action based on negligence. 10 7 The justices reiterated that at
common law, remedies are provided for persons injured by con-
duct of another that breaches a duty owed to them.108 Realizing
that the issue of damages is often problematic in suits for
wrongful birth, the court opined: "[t]he outlines of the duty are
[often] more apparent than the remedy [that] society chooses to
provide. Such is the case at hand."10 9
The court surveyed the different legal positions advanced
by other state courts when confronted with the wrongful birth
issue, 1 0 and ultimately held that the proper elements of dam-
age were those that were a direct and probable result of the de-
nizes a claim for wrongful birth, and if so, what damages may be considered by the
trier of fact. Id.
106. Id. The court provided no rationale for this distinction. See source cited
supra note 17 for a definition of wrongful conception.
107. The court did not mention the word "negligence" at the outset of its opin-
ion. However, in its discussion of risk, duty and injury, it introduced the concept of
negligently inflicted harm. For a discussion of these elements, see sources cited
infra notes 108, 256, and accompanying text.
108. Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1004. As with any cause of action based on negli-
gence, a successful wrongful birth claim requires an initial demonstration by the
parent plaintiffs that the defendant physician owed them a legal duty. Duty is a
legally recognized obligation to conform to a specific standard of conduct toward
another. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 53, at 356. A physician is under a
duty to provide his patients with professional medical care, Becker v. Schwartz,
400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1979), a standard that is defined as that "degree of
learning and skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners of the medical profession in
the same locality." Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (Ct. App. 1967). Al-
though the degree of learning and skill often varies from one locality to another, all
physicians are required to exercise ordinary care in applying those skills that they
do possess. In the context of a wrongful birth action, the physician is charged with
using due care when performing a sterilization operation, an abortion, or when
diagnosing a mother or her fetus for disease or abnormalities. If the physician
fails to conform to the applicable standard of due care, the duty owed to the patient
is breached. Thus, in failing to successfully perform a tubal ligation or in mis-
diagnosing the health of a fetus, a physician commits such a breach.
109. Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1004.
110. Id. at 1005 (citing Christensen v. Thomby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934),
for the propositions that a recovery for wrongful birth is unwarranted because the
damages are unforeseeable and remote and that the birth of a child is always a
"blessing"). However, the New Hampshire court ultimately rejected this position,
stressing that "nonrecognition of any cause of action for wrongful conception leaves
a void in the area of recovery for medical malpractice and dilutes the standard of
professional conduct and expertise in the area of family planning. . . ." Id.
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fendant's negligence. Nevertheless, the court limited the
recovery to the cost of sterilization and the medical expenses,
pain and suffering, and lost wages caused by the pregnancy,
and denied the plaintiffs' costs for rearing."' It concluded that
this was the most logical and humane view because it allowed
parents to recover without granting them a windfall or placing
an unreasonable burden on the negligent physician.12
Curiously, the Kingsbury court did not set forth a rationale
in support of its position that allowing rearing costs would
grant a windfall to the defendant; nor did it proffer any justifi-
cation for its desire to insulate the negligent physician from lia-
The Kingsbury court viewed Custodio v. Bauer as presenting the "extreme
edge or frontier" of the different positions courts have taken with respect to wrong-
ful birth claims. Id. The Custodio court awarded the plaintiffs the costs of raising
a child, thereby fully compensating them for the injury they suffered as a result of
the physician's negligence. See sources cited supra notes 45-55 and sources cited
infra notes 329-332 and accompanying text. The New Hampshire court discredited
Custodio's rationale that wrongful birth was "analytically indistinguishable from
an ordinary medical malpractice action... [iun no other situation is a new human
life created." Id.
The third position the Kingsbury court studied was that first taken by the
Michigan Court of Appeals in 1971 in Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1971). See sources cited supra 71-76 and accompanying text. The Kingsbury
court strenuously rejected the theory in Troppi v. Scarf, that recovery for the rea-
sonably foreseeable costs of raising the child should be allowed, but offset by an
amount equal to the value of the benefits conferred to the parents as a result of the
child's birth, as an illogical attempt to "reduce the magnitude of verdicts and
lessen the monetary shock to the medical tortfeasor." Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1006.
The New Hampshire court reasoned that a benefit cannot be reaped "from the total
failure of the medical service or treatment giving rise to the action." Id. It is inter-
esting to note that the benefits rule is actually RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920 (1979). For a discussion of section 920 as it relates to the cause of action for
wrongful birth, see sources cited infra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
The Kingsbury court completed its survey by adopting the approach pro-
nounced by the Illinois appeals court in Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479
(Ill. App. Ct.1979). See sources cited supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text
(discussing Wilczynski). In Wilczynski, the parents of an unplanned child brought
a wrongful birth action against their physician alleging that he negligently failed
to perform a successful abortion. 391 N.E.2d at 481. They sought, inter alia, com-
pensation for the costs they would incur in raising the child. The Illinois court
denied the plaintiff parents the costs of rearing for reasons of public policy, stating
that The Illinois Abortion Act of 1975 represents the State legislature's "strong
condemnation of abortion and support of the right to life .... ." Id. at 487 (constru-
ing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/1 (1977)). The Illinois Abortion Act of 1975 actually
sanctions abortions where "necessary to preserve the mother's life." 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 510/1.
111. Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1006.
112. Id.
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bility coextensive with his culpability. The court merely
concluded that rearing costs were not a proper element of dam-
age in a wrongful birth action. 113 The Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas reached the same conclusion as Kingsbury, but was less
reticent in its reasoning than was the New Hampshire court. In
Wilbur v. Kerr,"4 the Arkansas court was asked to determine
whether the parents of a healthy child born following the negli-
gent performance of a vasectomy on the plaintiff, could recover
the expenses of raising the child from the tort-feasing
physician. 15
Recognizing that most courts agree that wrongful birth is a
valid cause of action grounded in tort, but disagreeing on the
appropriate remedy, 116 the Wilbur court surveyed the various
policy reasons advanced for denying recovery for the expenses of
raising the unwanted child." 7 It was persuaded by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court's rationale in its first disposition of a wrong-
ful birth case. 118 In Rieck v. Medical Protective Company," 9 the
Wisconsin court, presented with a claim that the defendant
physician had failed to determine that the plaintiff mother was
pregnant in time for her to obtain a lawful abortion, denied
damages for raising the unplanned child based on the rationale
that such an award would shift the financial responsibility of
the child to the physician, while all other responsibilities re-
mained with the natural parents. This, the courts concurred,
would create a new and unwarranted category of surrogate par-
113. Id.
114. 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The court was not persuaded by the Texas Courts of Appeals' rationale in
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), a negligent sterilization
wrongful birth suit, that the benefits of raising a healthy child completely out-
weigh the financial burden suffered by the parents. Wilbur, 628 S.W.2d at 670
(citing Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 126). The Terrell court based its reasoning on the
"blessing" doctrine of Christensen v. Thornby, declaring:
Who can place a price tag on a child's smile or the parental pride in a child's
achievement[s]?... Rather than attempt to value these intangible benefits,
our courts have simply determined that public sentiment recognizes that
these benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss in rearing and
educating a healthy, normal child.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 128.
118. Wilbur, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
119. Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974).
2007] 263
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
ents.120 The Wilbur court maintained also that shifting the
costs of rearing would have damaging effects on the child him-
self. According to the Arkansas court, the child would be made
to feel, like an "emotional bastard"-a child who will someday
learn that he was unwanted because his rearing was paid for by
another. 121 Realizing that several courts had awarded plaintiff
parents expenses for rearing the unplanned child, the Wilbur
court maintained that in treating the issue as one of ordinary
damages, the recovery was logical. 122 It queried: "[s]hould par-
ents in this sophisticated day and time not have a right to plan
their family and avoid the economic hardship of raising a child
they chose not to have? Should [the] doctor not pay for all the
damages occasioned by his negligent act?" 123 However, the Ar-
kansas court declined to answer these questions in the affirma-
tive and consequently denied the parent's claim for damages for
the expenses incurred in raising the wrongfully born child. It
asserted that such a recovery would "undermine society's need
for a strong and healthy family relationship."124 The Wilbur
court held that the negligent physician was responsible for his
act, but limited that responsibility to "any and all proper dam-
ages connected with the operation and . . . the pregnancy." 25
Thus, Arkansas joined a majority of jurisdictions that do not
recognize rearing costs as an element of damages in a wrongful
birth action. 26
120. Id.
121. Wilbur, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
122. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976).
123. Wilbur, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
124. Id. at 571.
125. Id. The Wilbur court also raised the issue of whether a parent should be
asked to mitigate damages by aborting or offering the child for adoption. However,
the court dismissed this issue, stating that most courts have rejected the applica-
tion of the principle of mitigation in wrongful birth actions. Id.
126. Other jurisdictions that have denied parent plaintiffs recovery for rear-
ing costs include: Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (mother of unplanned, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against
physician who negligently performed tubal ligation); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627
S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy, child brought wrong-
ful birth action against physician for negligent performance of vasectomy); Sorkin
v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 1980) (parents of unplanned, healthy, child
born as the result of a negligently performed vasectomy brought wrongful birth
action against physician); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Med. Ctr., 268 N.W.2d 683
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Both the Kingsbury and Wilbur courts relied substantially
on policy reasons for their ultimate conclusions that rearing
costs were not a proper element of damages in wrongful birth
actions. While the Wilbur court mentioned the interests it was
attempting to promote 127 and the Kingsbury court made a cryp-
tic reference to the policy that it believed outweighed the par-
ents' right to be compensated for raising the unplanned child, 128
neither court focused attention directly on the economic loss
that plaintiff parents in wrongful birth actions would sustain as
a result of these narrow rulings. Through an invocation of pub-
lic policy, both courts indirectly reasoned that costs for rearing
were not a proper remedy because of the possibility of burden-
ing the physician 29 or emotionally damaging the child, 30 but
evaded the basic question of why the parents of the unplanned
child, instead of the negligent physician, should sustain the fi-
nancial burden of raising that child. The dissent in Wilbur real-
ized that this economic issue deserved greater attention. 31
Therefore, it suggested that rather than invoking public policy,
the court should allow a jury to award rearing costs, but offset
that award by an amount equal to the benefits the parents
would derive as a result of raising the child.132 This offsetting
benefits rule has been met with judicial approval in other
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (patient and wife brought action against physician to recover
for wrongful birth resulting from negligence in performing vasectomy).
Focusing on this issue of damages, two members of the Arkansas court in Wil-
bur dissented, asserting that they disagreed with the majority's invocation of pub-
lic policy for the purpose of denying proper application of the common law rules of
tort damages. 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dudley, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
the court was subtly promoting a public policy that encourages abortion or adop-
tion by disallowing damages for raising the child. Id. It concluded by concurring
with those courts that have adopted the theory of full recovery offset by any bene-
fits the parents derived from raising the unplanned child. Id.; see, e.g., Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); see also sources cited infra notes
320-32 and accompanying text.
127. See Wilbur, 628 S.W. 2d at 571.
128. See sources cited supra note 110.
129. Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1003 (N.H. 1982).
130. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).
131. 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dudley, J., dissenting) (stating that: "The compensa-
tion is not for the so-called unwanted child or 'emotional bastard' but to replenish
the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive the other members of
the family of what was planned as their just share of the family income.") (citing
Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967)).
132. 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
25
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:241
states,133 and was adopted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut
three months after the Arkansas court decided Wilbur.34
B. The Benefits Rule: A Balancing Test to Offset an Award of
Rearing Costs
In Ochs v. Borrelli,135 the Connecticut Supreme Court was
confronted with the wrongful birth issue and was asked to de-
termine, inter alia, whether the parents of a child conceived af-
ter a negligently performed sterilization may be compensated
by the negligent physician for the costs of rearing. 3 6 The defen-
dant, having admitted to being negligent, 37 argued that public
policy required the court to hold that a child is always a bless-
ing to its parents, and that this "benefit" must, as a matter of
law, totally offset any concomitant financial burden. 38 The
court, noting that this was a case of first impression, began re-
viewing the state of the law by citing various other courts that
had dealt with this issue. 139 Determined that public policy
should not create an exception "to the normal duty of a
tortfeasor to assume liability for all the damages that he has
proximately caused,"' 40 and intent upon protecting the exercise
133. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1976); Troppi v.
Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
134. Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982).
135. Id.
136. The issue of whether the trial court's award of damages for medical ex-
penses and pain and suffering occasioned by the unsuccessful sterilization was ex-
cessive was also raised on appeal. The court discussed the plaintiff mother's claim
that she suffered months of severe physical discomfort, numerous painful medical
procedures and serious emotional distress throughout her pregnancy, and deter-
mined that the award was not excessive. Id. at 886.
137. The defendant physician, Dr. Borrelli, admitted his negligence and lim-
ited his appeal to the proper measurement of damages. Id. at 884.
138. Id.
139. The Ochs court cited Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis.
1974), Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982), Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d
8 (Del. 1975), and Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), as
courts that have completely denied rearing costs when awarding damages in
wrongful birth actions. Id. at 885. The court also cites Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967). Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) and Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977), as courts
that have allowed parents to recover child rearing expenses. Id.
140. Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885.
266
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of the rights of privacy adopted in Griswold and Roe,14 1 the Ochs
court awarded the parents the expenses of rearing the unplan-
ned child offset by the value of the benefits conferred on the
parents by having the child. 142 The court, however, did not pro-
vide any guidelines for the trier of fact to employ when attempt-
ing to determine the value of those benefits.
The defendant argued that allowing any recovery for the
costs of raising the child would "erroneously equate the birth of
a child with an injury to its parents."143 The Connecticut court
rejected this assertion. Maintaining that parents are often rec-
ompensed for their economic expenditures incurred in raising a
child through the intangible rewards that the experience
brings, the court nevertheless emphasized that the expense of
rearing is often injurious because of the financial burden it im-
poses. It stated: "parental pleasure softens[,] but does not erad-
icate economic reality."144
The Ochs court emphasized that it was not shifting the en-
tire economic burden of parenthood to the negligent physi-
cian. 45 Specifically, the ruling in Ochs requires the trier of fact
to weigh the intangible benefits of having a child against the
financial costs that are incurred in raising that child. Once the
benefits are calculated, they are to be used to offset the ex-
penses and, therefore, to reduce the negligent physician's liabil-
ity. 46 The Connecticut court declined to offer any methodology
to assist the jury in balancing these factors. 47 It did, though,
defend its balancing test against the defendant's contention
that it involved impermissible speculation. 148 Realizing that
this test required the jury to balance economic factors against
non-economic factors, the court maintained that the weighing
was no more speculative than the process used by courts in de-
141. For a discussion of the holdings in Griswold and Roe, see sources cited
supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
142. Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885-86; see Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990);
see also sources cited infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
143. Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885-86.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 885. For a discussion for the rule of offsetting benefits, see sources
cited infra notes 315-49 and accompanying text.
146. Ochs, 445 A.2d at 886.
147. For a discussion of this balancing test, see sources cited infra notes 315-
39 and accompanying text.
148. Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885-86.
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termining damages for wrongful death. 149 Thus, the court as-
serted that the balancing test was not impermissibly
speculative. 150
The Ochs court's adoption of a balancing test to offset the
award of rearing costs to parents of an unplanned child aligned
Connecticut with the minority of jurisdictions that had dealt
with wrongful birth claims. 151 This approach, unlike that taken
by the New Hampshire court in Kingsbury 52 and the Arkansas
court in Wilbur,5 3 focuses on the economic factors involved in
wrongful birth. However, irrespective of its more equitable ap-
proach, the Connecticut court failed to completely compensate
the plaintiff parents for the financial burden incurred as a di-
rect and proximate result of the defendant physician's negli-
gence. In doing so, Connecticut joined the majority of
jurisdictions that have been challenged by wrongful birth
claims involving the birth of a healthy child. 54
Courts deciding wrongful birth claims involving infants
born with a disease or abnormality, however, have been more
willing to award the plaintiff parents costs for raising an un-
planned or unwanted child. 55
C. Awarding Full Compensation: Rearing Costs Allowed for
Abnormal Children
In cases of first impression, the Supreme Courts of Penn-
sylvania and Virginia, in Speck v. Finegold 56 and Naccash v.
Burger, 57 respectively, allowed the parents of wrongfully born
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Other jurisdictions that have recognized the offsetting balancing test
include: Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1976); Michigan, Troppi v.
Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d. 169 (Minn. 1977).
152. See sources cited supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
153. See sources cited supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
154. See sources cited supra notes 126 and 151 (discussing other jurisdictions
in accord).
155. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); see also
infra notes 159-81 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales proffered by
the Pennsylvania and Virginia courts in holding the defendant physician liable for
rearing costs).
156. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
157. 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
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and genetically defective children to recover child-rearing costs
from the physician whose negligence caused the birth. 158
In Speck v. Finegold, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
addressed the wrongful birth cause of action under a compelling
set of facts. 159 The plaintiffs were the parents of two children
born with a genetic defect called neurofibromatosis. 160 For ge-
netic and economic reasons, the plaintiffs decided not to parent
other children. Mr. Speck engaged the defendant, Dr. Finegold,
to perform a vasectomy on him. However, after the operation
was performed, Mrs. Speck became pregnant. Mrs. Speck then
requested the other defendant, Dr. Schwartz, to terminate her
pregnancy. After the operation, Mrs. Speck informed Dr.
Schwartz of her belief that she was still pregnant, but she was
assured that the pregnancy had been aborted. Four months af-
ter her surgery, Mrs. Speck gave birth to a daughter who also
inherited neurofibromatosis. One year later, the Specks filed
their suit.161
In addressing the issue of wrongful birth, the Pennsylvania
court asserted that a disposition of the claim requires "the ex-
158. Speck, 439 A.2d 110; Naccash, 290 S.E.2d 825. The Speck decision has
since been rendered moot by the Pennsylvania legislature's enactment of a statute
disallowing any cause of action for wrongful birth. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8305(a) (West 2005); see also infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
159. The court was also asked to determine whether Pennsylvania would rec-
ognize a cause of action for wrongful life. The court, evenly divided on the issue,
affirmed the superior court's order that the infant plaintiffs cause of action was
not legally cognizable. Speck, 439 A.2d at 116. For a discussion of wrongful life
and why it has been met with judicial disfavor, see supra note 1.
160. In Speck, the court explained:
Neurofibromatosis (von Recklinghausen's Disease) is a disease resultant
from a hereditary defect, due to an autosomal dominant gene, characterized
by developmental changes in the nervous system, muscles, bones and skin.
Skin changes vary from trivial (CafiL au lait spots) to extremely disfiguring.
The condition is marked superficially by the formation of many peduncu-
lated soft tumors (neurofibromas); however, neurofibromas are also found
on cranial nerves and nerve roots. Bilateral acoustic (organs of hearing)
neurofibromata (tumors on tumors) occasionally complicate neurofibro-
matosis in children.
Id. Bone changes are often seen. Neurofibromata are benign and malignant
change is rare. Yet, in the central nervous system malignant tumors may appear,
the most common of which is glioma of the optic nerve. The condition is both con-
genital and heredofamilial (inherited by more than one member of a family). The
clinical course is variable, making prognosis at any given time difficult. There is
no known treatment or cure for the disease. Speck, 439 A.2d at 112 n.2.
161. Id. at 113.
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tension of existing principles of tort law to new facts."1 62 Based
on this premise, the Speck court maintained that common law
principles of damages apply and, therefore, the physician is re-
sponsible for the "natural and probable consequences of his
misconduct."163
The defendants, however, asserted that "because the public
policy of the Commonwealth favors birth over abortion, the ap-
proval of such a cause of action [would be] in contravention of a
legislatively declared policy."1 64 The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that recognition of this cause of action merely af-
fords the victims of negligently performed sterilization or
abortion procedures the same legal protection guaranteed to
victims of other forms of medical malpractice, without affecting
abortion activity within Pennsylvania. 65
The court maintained that if no duty were imposed on phy-
sicians in this area, the fundamental principles of tort law-
compensating the victim, deterring negligence and encouraging
due care-would be frustrated. 166 Unwilling to grant an "unjus-
tifiable and unfair windfall to the defendants" and allow them
to escape liability for the substantial injuries they negligently
caused the plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs could re-
cover expenses incurred for giving birth to and raising their
daughter. 167 In addition, the court allowed recovery for the
mental distress and physical inconvenience that the parents
suffered as a result of their daughter's wrongful birth. 68
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
165. Id. In addition, the Speck court argued that denial of a wrongful birth
cause of action would undermine the constitutional protection afforded abortion by
the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), by denying
a remedy to a victim who is injured as a result of exercising her right. For a dis-
cussion of Roe, see supra note 14.
166. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981).
167. Id. at 115.
168. Id. In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed that public policy had ab-
solutely no relevance to the question of wrongful birth. He stated that "[n]othing
about sterilization or abortion requires the application of legal principles different
from those controlling in other medical malpractice actions." Id. at 117 (Kauff-
man, J., concurring). The sole dissenter insisted that because wrongful birth was
an action that involved the creation of a new human life, the court could not recog-
nize it as a tort and had to defer the issue to the legislature. Id. at 118-22 (Nix, J.,
dissenting).
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In determining that the parents of a wrongfully born and
abnormal child can recover rearing costs from the negligent
physician, the Speck court denied the defendant's argument
that public policy contravened such an award. 6 9 In refusing to
invoke public policy to insulate the negligent physician from lia-
bility for his tort, the Speck court resolved the wrongful birth
issue solely on the basis of common law principles of dam-
ages. 170 In so doing, the Pennsylvania court joined a growing
minority of jurisdictions that fully compensate the plaintiff par-
ents in wrongful birth actions. 17'
In 1982, the Supreme Court of Virginia joined this growing
minority. In Naccash v. Burger,172 Virginia recognized a cause
of action for wrongful birth on behalf of the parents of a child
born with a disease that a physician negligently failed to diag-
nose during the mother's pregnancy. 173 The plaintiffs brought
suit against the defendant physician and testified that, had
they known they were carriers, they would have insisted upon
amniocentesis. 174 If the test had indicated that the fetus was
afflicted with the disease, Mrs. Burger would have had an abor-
tion. 75 The Burgers sued the physician for the expenses in-
curred in caring for their daughter during her short life, and for
169. For a discussion of the court's rationale, see supra notes 164-66 and ac-
companying text.
170. 439 A.2d at 118 (Kauffman, J., concurring).
171. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982). See also infra notes 172-81 and accompanying
text (discussing Naccash).
172. 290 S.E.2d 825.
173. Id. at 827. The plaintiffs daughter, born with Tay-Sachs disease, died
two years after her birth. Tay-Sachs disease is "an invariably fatal disease of the
brain and spinal cord that occurs in Jewish infants of European ancestry. A dis-
eased child appears normal at birth, but, at four to six months, its central nervous
system begins to degenerate, and it suffers eventual blindness, deafness, paralysis,
seizures, and mental retardation. The life expectancy of an afflicted child is two to
four years." Id. During her mother's pregnancy, her father was tested for Tay-
Sachs and was told that he was not a carrier. However, after being retested, Mr.
Burger was informed that he was, in fact, a Tay-Sachs carrier. During Mrs. Bur-
ger's fourth month of pregnancy, she began to exhibit abnormalities. An examina-
tion revealed that she, too, was a carrier of Tay-Sachs disease. Id.
174. Id. Amniocentesis is a procedure in which fluid from the pregnant wo-
man's amniotic sac is withdrawn and studied to determine bio-chemical make-up.
An analysis of the chromosomes present in the fluid enables physicians to deter-
mine if the fetus is developing normally. See id. at 827 n.1.
175. Id. at 827.
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the mental anguish and suffering they experienced as a result
of the wrongful birth. 176
The physician in Naccash argued that the parents had no
cause of action because it was unknown to the common law and
the legislature had not created it. 177 The court, however, re-
sponded that recognition of such a claim should be based on
traditional tort law principles, and, because the determination
of the scope of the common law doctrine of negligence is within
the province of the judiciary, the issue was not open to legisla-
tive sanction. 78 After discussing the elements of negligence
that must be present to hold a defendant liable, 79 the Virginia
court concluded that Dr. Naccash breached a legal duty owed to
the Burgers. In so doing, the court asserted that he caused
them a direct injury, thereby allowing them to recover any dam-
ages which were the reasonable and proximate consequences of
the defendant's negligent act. 80 The court held that since a rea-
sonable person could have foreseen the financial and emotional
loss that resulted from the physician's negligence, the parents
were entitled to recover damages for those injuries. 81
In allowing the plaintiff parents to recover all damages that
were the foreseeable result of the physician's negligence, the
Naccash court fully compensated the plaintiffs for the loss they
suffered due to the birth of their genetically defective child. 8 2
The Virginia court premised its position on the common law
rules of negligence and damages, as the Pennsylvania court had
done in Speck v. Finegold.8 3 As opposed to the positions taken
by the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire, 84 Arkansas, 85 and
176. Id. at 828.
177. Id. For a discussion of the same argument espoused by the dissent in
Speck, see supra note 168.
178. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 828.
179. Id.; see also supra note 108 and infra note 256 (discussing these
elements).
180. Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
181. Id. at 833 (awarding the Burgers $178,673.80 in damages).
182. Id.
183. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
184. Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982). See also supra notes
101-13 and accompanying text.
185. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982). See also supra notes 114-26
and accompanying text.
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Connecticut18 6 in the same year, neither the Pennsylvania nor
the Virginia court allowed claims of public policy to abrogate
those principles.'l 7 While the New Hampshire court, in Kings-
bury v. Smith, 88 denied the plaintiffs costs for raising the
wrongfully born child, partly because of its concern that such an
award would create a windfall to the parents, 8 9 the Penn-
sylvania court, in Speck v. Finegold,190 allowed that element of
damages in order to avoid granting an unjustifiable and unfair
windfall to the physician.' 91 The sine qua non of this inconsis-
tency centers on the health of the wrongful birth child. 92 By
focusing on this aspect, rather than on the interests that the
plaintiffs were attempting to protect through their desire not to
parent a child, courts are not able to make a knowledgeable or
accurate determination of the extent of damages plaintiff par-
ents have suffered.' 93 However, this interest can be determined
easily by applying fundamental principles of tort law, 9 4 and the
extent of the injury can be ascertained by employing basic prin-
ciples of common law damages. 95
186. Ochs v. Borrelli, 442 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982). See also supra notes 135-50
and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (analyzing the Penn-
sylvania court's discussion of public policy).
188. 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982).
189. Id. at 1006.
190. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1982).
191. Id. at 115.
192. The position is evidenced by the New Hampshire court's statement in
Kingsbury v. Smith: "The ruling today is limited to the facts of this case, involving
a faulty sterilization procedure that resulted in the birth of a healthy child. Other
and differing circumstances, including but not limited to the birth of an abnormal
or injured child, might lead us to a different conclusion." 442 A.2d at 1006.
193. For example, the Speck court did ascertain the parents' interests. It de-
termined that the plaintiff parents decided not to have other children "for genetic
and economic reasons." Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1981) (emphasis
added). Therefore, by awarding rearing costs, the Pennsylvania court could not be
criticized for creating a windfall to the parents. See infra notes 349-56 and accom-
panying text for a full discussion of this argument. The Speck decision was indi-
rectly overturned by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1998 when it enacted 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2005), which denies claims for "wrongful birth."
But see Butler v. Rolling Hill Hosp., 582 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), and infra
note 209 and accompanying text; Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990), and
infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of this approach, see infra notes 350-56 and accompany-
ing text.
195. Id.
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Although they failed to define this interest, the five courts
that recognized the wrongful birth cause of action during the
seminal year of 1982 determined liability by applying the tradi-
tional negligence framework to new facts. 196 Since that time,
there has been very little deviation from those decisions. 197 In
ascertaining the extent of that liability, however, these courts
generally either failed to apply or misapplied fundamental rules
of common law damages, thereby further diminishing the possi-
bility of an accurate calculation of damages and increasing the
likelihood of awarding a windfall to one of the parties. 98
III. Wrongful Birth Attempts to Grow Up
A. Legislatures Interfere and Deny the Cause of Action
Beginning in the early twenty-first century, nine state leg-
islatures relieved their state courts from deciding cases regard-
ing this troublesome tort.199 In doing so, those legislatures
deprived injured plaintiffs of redress from an entire sector of
the population: physicians and other health care providers who
engaged in the basic and centuries-old tort of negligently in-
flicted harm.
The Pennsylvania statute,200 enacted in 1988, is a typical
example, and states: "There shall be no cause of action or award
of damages on behalf of any person based on a claim that, but
196. As one earlier court maintained:
Contraception, conjugal relations, and childbirth are highly charged sub-
jects. It is all the more important, then, to emphasize that resolution of the
case before us requires no intrusion into the domain of moral philosophy. At
issue here is simply the extent to which defendant is civilly liable for the
consequences of his negligence. In reversing and remanding for trial, we go
no further than to apply settled common-law principles.
Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
197. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 228-56 and accompanying text (discussing damages
within the context of wrongful birth).
199. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (West
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.424 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03-43 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-55-1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (West 2005).
200. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 2005) (prohibiting an action for
"wrongful life"). For a discussion of wrongful life, see supra note 1.
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for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once conceived
would not or should not have been born."
Somewhat ironically, Pennsylvania had, through its courts,
supported the basic right of its citizens to recover for negli-
gently inflicted harm.201 The legislature's decision to relieve
physicians and other health care providers from their duty to
act with due care had little to do with tort reform or lobbying by
physicians; it had everything to do with abortion.20 2
The legislative history of the Pennsylvania statute20 3 is re-
plete with indications that it was not proposed, drafted and
passed for the purpose of fundamental tort reform; it was en-
acted to deter women from having abortions. The legislature
"intended to accomplish this purpose by encouraging physicians
to withhold information from women about the health of their
fetuses-information that might lead women to seek
abortions."204
One commentator has argued that the Pennsylvania stat-
ute is unconstitutional because it infringes upon a woman's
right to give informed consent to terminate her pregnancy.205
According to this argument, although the statute may appear
neutral on its face, the legislative history is replete with evi-
dence of a desire by the legislators to discourage abortions. 20 6
Irrespective of such arguments, the Pennsylvania courts
(as well as courts in the eight other states that have enacted
nearly identical statutes) have consistently upheld the constitu-
tionality (under both the State and Federal Constitutions) of
statutes barring claims for wrongful life and wrongful birth.
Facing challenges to such statutes, courts have frequently
opined that the statute in question does not deny a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy; it merely prevents her from
201. See Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
202. For a discussion of the difficulty courts have had regarding a plaintiffs
decision to mitigate her damages by terminating an unplanned or unwanted preg-
nancy, see infra notes 273-314 and accompanying text.
203. See PA. HOUSE LEGIS. J. 1509 (June 20, 1984).
204. See Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes
Barring Claims for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth are Unconstitutional Under
the Purpose Prong of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 239
(1995).
205. Id. at 265-71.
206. Id. at 238-39, 268-69.
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suing a health-care professional for his or her medical malprac-
tice. 20 7 One federal court, interpreting the Pennsylvania stat-
ute, made this extremely clear by stating that Pennsylvania's
wrongful birth statute merely immunizes the health care pro-
vider from liability for negligence. 208
Arguably, the only rational decision handed down by a
Pennsylvania court since the enactment of its statute barring
claims for wrongful birth, was that in Butler v. Rolling Hill Hos-
pital.20 9 In Butler, the court stated that the Pennsylvania
wrongful birth statute would not allow a patient to bring an ac-
tion for damages against a doctor who failed to timely order a
pregnancy test and diagnose the patient's pregnancy, thus
preventing the plaintiff from being able to legally abort the
child. However, importantly and wisely, it held that the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover damages for "medical expenses and
lost wages related to pre-natal care, delivery, and post-natal
care, as well as compensation for pain and suffering incurred
during the pre-natal through post-natal periods" from the doc-
207. For instance, in Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the court held that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting a
cause of action for wrongful birth did not violate the pregnant woman's constitu-
tional right to choose abortion over childbirth. Her freedom to decide was not im-
paired, even though the statute denied her the right to bring an action for damages
against the physician who negligently failed to diagnose defects in the fetus. The
statute neither regulated nor directly affected the woman's right to abortion. Id.
at 554-55. Dansby also held that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate a preg-
nant woman's equal protection rights, by arbitrarily distinguishing between vic-
tims of doctor's pre-conception and post-conception negligence. Id. at 556. The
statute was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting fetal
life, reducing the number of medical malpractice actions, and keeping the cost of
medical malpractice insurance low. Id. at 558. See also Flickinger v. Wanczyk,
843 F. Supp. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (action by parents of a child born with undiag-
nosed spina bifida against doctors and fetal screening diagnostic laboratories,
holding that neither Pennsylvania's wrongful birth statute nor Pennsylvania's de-
nial of a cause of action for wrongful birth encourages negligent behavior, to con-
vert physicians and laboratories into state actors for purposes of a Section 1983
civil rights claim; Pennsylvania law did not encourage private doctors and labora-
tories "to infringe upon a woman's right to make an informed choice regarding her
pregnancy"); Bianchini v. N.K.D.S. Assocs., Ltd., 616 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (statute precluding recovery for wrongful birth applied to suit seeking dam-
ages on grounds that untimely diagnosis of fetal abnormalities precluded mother
from having an abortion and subjected her to physical and emotional traumas in-
volved in carrying the child to term).
208. Flickinger, 843 F. Supp. at 35.
209. 582 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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tor who had previously performed an unsuccessful tubal liga-
tion and laparoscopic procedure. 210
The Butler court, in casting the plaintiffs cause of action in
the terms of negligence, instead of "wrongful birth," allowed the
damaged plaintiff a remedy for her financial loss. By utilizing
such a fair and rational approach, the court was able to over-
come the potential unjust influence of the Pennsylvania statute.
In states where the cause of action for wrongful birth is not
barred by statute, the majority of courts provide the remedy
chosen by the Butler court.21' Some legislatures have expressed
concern that allowing a wrongful birth cause of action would
condone the potential plaintiffs right to legally terminate her
pregnancy, an option which a defendant might raise to mitigate
the extent of his financial liability. However, an astute plaintiff
who is not seeking rearing costs for an unplanned or unwanted
child can bypass these draconian statutes by simply pleading
traditional negligently inflicted harm.
As Dean Prosser astutely observed, the particular name a
tort bears is of little relevance to the real issue-whether "the
plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the
conduct of the defendant."212 Outside of the nine states that leg-
islatively bar actions for "wrongful birth," the courts have
heeded Dean Prosser's sage commentary, but not without strug-
gling with the proper measure of damages.
B. Courts Continue to Struggle Unnecessarily
Today, thirty-two jurisdictions in the United States provide
a cause of action for the wrongful birth of a healthy child.213
210. Id. at 1385 (citing Mason v. W. Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982)).
211. See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
212. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 1, at 4.
213. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Univ. of Ariz.
Health Sci. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d
568 (Ark. 1982); Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983); Ochs v. Bor-
relli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Ramey v.
Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v.
Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill.
1983); Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Johnston v. Elkins, 736
P.2d 935 (Kan. 1987); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981);
Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429
(Md. 1984); Clevenger v. Haling, 394 N.E.2d 1119 (Mass. 1979); Clapham v.
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Only a handful of states allow an injured plaintiff to recover for
rearing costs. 214 Twenty-nine jurisdictions have ruled that the
costs of rearing the unplanned or unwanted child are absolutely
not recoverable based on a number of different rationales. 215
The most recent reported decision that denied recovery for
child-rearing expenses, Chaffee v. Seslar,21 6 held that "the costs
involved in raising and educating a normal, healthy child con-
Yanga, 300 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Hardin v. Farris, 530 P.2d 407 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974);
Mears v. Alhadeff, 451 N.Y.S.2d 133 (App. Div. 1982); Pierce v. Piver, 262 S.E.2d
320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976); Mason v.
W. Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.
1987); Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); McKernan v.
Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
1985); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990); Beardsley v. Wierd-
sma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
214. See Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. Center v. Sup. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz.
1983); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967); Burke v. Rivo, 551
N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977);
Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Zehr v. Haugen, 871 P.2d
1006 (Or. 1994); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981); Naccash v. Burger,
290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
215. The Indiana Supreme Court, in Chaffee v. Seslar, 876 N.E.2d 705, 709
(Ind. 2003), provided the following list of jurisdictions that deny a plaintiff recov-
ery for rearing costs: Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Alaska:
M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851 (Alaska 1998); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568
(Ark. 1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Fassoulas
v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v.
Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill.
1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Johnston v. Elkins, 736 P.2d
935 (Kan. 1987); Kentucky: Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Pitre v.
Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d
810 (Me. 1986); Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Girdley v.
Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992); Hitzemann v. Adam, 518 N.W.2d 102 (Neb.
1994); Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442
A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Gracia v. Meiselman, 531 A.2d 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1985); Jackson v. Bum-
gardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986); Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540
N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989); Wofford v. Davis, 764 P.2d 161 (Okla. 1988); Butler v.
Rolling Hill Hosp., 582 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Emerson v. Magendantz,
689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987); Terrell v.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah
1988); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687
P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Beards-
ley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). See also case cited infra note 216 and
accompanying text.
216. 786 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ind. 2003).
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ceived subsequent to an allegedly negligent sterilization proce-
dure are not cognizable as damages in an action for medical
negligence." The Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that "re-
gardless of the circumstance of birth, [a child] does not consti-
tute a 'harm' to the parents so as to permit recovery for the costs
associated with raising and educating the child.., the value of
a child's life to the parents outweighs the associated pecuniary
burdens as a matter of law."217
Applying this facile and ill-advised line of reasoning, the
Seslar court joined the majority of jurisdictions in denying rear-
ing costs based on medical malpractice resulting from a physi-
cian's incompetence. 218
Conversely, one court chose to apply the traditional and
time-honored principles of tort law to the issue of negligently
inflicted harm with respect to damage calculation. In Burke v.
Rivo, 21 9 the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts to resolve the issue of rearing costs when her
physician negligently performed a sterilization procedure that
allowed her to give birth to a healthy child.
The plaintiff wife, Carole Burke, sought the sterilization
procedure from the defendant because the "Burke family was
experiencing financial difficulties. She wanted to return to
work to support her family and to fulfil [sic] her career goals."22 o
The defendant physician recommended and performed a bipolar
cauterization procedure and guaranteed that plaintiff would not
become pregnant again; nevertheless, Burke gave birth to an-
other child.
The Massachusetts court recognized that: "The great
weight of authority permits the parents of a normal child born
as a result of a physician's negligence to recover damages di-
rectly associated with the birth . . . but courts are divided on
217. Id. at 708.
218. See supra note 200.
219. 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990). The procedural posture of this opinion is
somewhat convoluted. However, it was essentially a certified question from the
lower court asking for guidance on the following: "What is the measure of damages
in an action claiming (a) breach of a guarantee that a surgical procedure would
forever prevent pregnancy; and (b) negligence in performing that procedure, where
the child born as a result of the pregnancy was in every way normal and healthy?"
Id. at 2 n.2.
220. Id. at 2.
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whether the parents may recover the economic expense of rear-
ing the child." 221 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court that proper damages would include, at a minimum:
The cost of the unsuccessful sterilization procedure and costs di-
rectly flowing from the pregnancy: the wife's lost earning capac-
ity; medical expenses of the delivery and care following the birth;
the cost of care for the other children while the wife was incapaci-
tated; the cost of the second sterilization procedure and any ex-
penses flowing from that operation; and the husband's loss of
consortium [and the emotional distress associated with the un-
wanted pregnancy] .222
Recognizing that the "principal issue" before it was
"whether the plaintiffs [were] entitled, if they establish[ed] lia-
bility, to the cost of raising their child," the court made it clear
that under both contract and tort principles, the expenses asso-
ciated with rearing the unplanned child were "a reasonably
foreseeable and a natural and probable consequence of the
wrongs that the plaintiffs allege."223 The court queried whether
there were any public policy considerations that should limit
"traditional tort and contract damages," and concluded that
"there [were] none as to parents who have elected sterilization
for economic reasons."224
The Massachusetts court concluded that the parents of a
healthy but (at least initially) unwanted child could recover the
cost of rearing that child if their "reason for seeking steriliza-
tion was founded on economic or financial considerations."225
Nevertheless, it also stated that "the trier of fact should offset
against the cost of rearing the child the benefit, if any, the par-
ents receive and will receive from having their child."226
Thus, the Massachusetts court joined the five other juris-
dictions that allow recovery of the cost of rearing a normal child
to adulthood, generally offset by the benefits that the parents
221. Id. at 3 (listing seventeen different cases denying the recovery of child-
rearing costs).
222. Id. at 3-4.
223. Id. at 4.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id.; see also infra notes 315-44 and accompanying text.
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receive in giving birth to and raising a normal, healthy child. 227
Although this approach is preferable to an outright denial of
damages to the injured plaintiff, it still misses the basic point of
the cause of action for negligently inflicted harm.
IV. The Obfuscation of Principles and Policies of Common
Law Damages for Negligence in the Context of
Wrongful Birth: Frequent Misapplication
and Non-Application
The primary purpose of tort law in awarding damages to
injured parties is to return plaintiffs to the positions they were
in prior to the negligent conduct of the tortfeasor. 22s The law
attempts to compensate the victim for the loss he has suffered
by awarding money damages. 229 A secondary, though signifi-
cant goal of the damages remedy is the prophylactic factor-the
attempt to deter negligence and promote the exercise of due
care on the part of a defendant and his peers. 230
To properly achieve these objectives, courts have developed
principles for determining the fact or extent of a recovery.
227. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ex-
plaining that because the benefit conferred did not affect the economic interest
that was harmed, no mitigation of the cost of child-rearing should be recognized);
Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (Ariz. 1983);
Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885-86 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d
429, 435-36 (Md. 1984); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175-76
(Minn. 1977).
228. See generally 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (7th ed. 1987).
229. One exception is punitive damages. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAM-
AGES § 77, at 275 (1935). Punitive damages have been claimed in only one wrong-
ful birth case. See Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967) (allowing
the plaintiff parents to plead fraud and deceit after the physician represented to
the plaintiff mother that a sterilization operation was necessary for her physical
and mental well-being).
230. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 4, at 25. As Prosser and Keeton
elaborate:
The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has been quite impor-
tant in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensa-
tion of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the
decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may
be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence
of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability is the delib-
erate purpose of providing that incentive.
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Thus, damages in tort may be denied based on public policy,231
or because it is impossible to calculate them without specula-
tion.232 In addition, damage awards may be offset by the plain-
tiffs failure to mitigate the loss, 233 or by the plaintiffs receipt of
a benefit through the loss he suffered. 234
Each of these firmly established damage principles has
been used in the disposition of wrongful birth cases. 235 How-
ever, as applied to this area of the law, these principles have
often served to insulate members of the medical profession from
full liability for the losses they have occasioned. 236 For instance,
a Kentucky court of appeals, when faced with a claim for rear-
ing costs in a wrongful birth case, admitted that it would defy
logic and the concepts of causation to propose that such dam-
ages should not be submitted to a jury for assessment. 237 It con-
tinued: "Common sense tells us that it is in society's best
interests to hold physicians to a standard of professional compe-
tence and impose liability when they are negligent in treating
their patients."238 Nevertheless, the court resorted to an unde-
fined public policy in denying the plaintiff parents recovery for
the costs of raising the unwanted child. 239 Other courts, al-
though misapplying these principles and policies, have been
231. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (holding that plaintiff
could not recover from surgeon for alleged improper performance of sterilization
operation because the value of a human life outweighs any damage which might
follow the birth).
232. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (denying
damages in a negligent sterilization wrongful birth case, partly because it was im-
possible to calculate proper damages without speculation).
233. See Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974) (noting
that the absence of steps to terminate parental rights is material as it reflects
parental intent to keep and raise child); see also infra notes 273-314 and accompa-
nying text (discussing damage mitigation in wrongful birth suits).
234. See infra notes 315-44 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
rule).
235. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 236-
40 and accompanying text.
236. For a discussion of the often spurious manners with which courts have
employed these postulates, see infra notes 241-56 and accompanying text.
237. Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (parents
brought action in tort against physician for the birth of an unwanted child, alleg-
ing negligence in the performance of a bilateral vasectomy upon husband).
238. Id. at 48.
239. Id. (finding that without a clear expression of public opinion to the con-
trary, public policy prohibits the extension of liability to include damages for rear-
ing an unwanted child).
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more generous in defining their rationales for limiting
recovery. 240
A. The Invocation of Public Policy to Defeat an Award of
Rearing Costs
The most frequently cited policy argument used to deny
plaintiff parents recovery for the costs of rearing the unplanned
child is that the child would suffer irreparable harm by forever
shouldering the burden of having been born an "emotional bas-
tard.''241 The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Wilbur v. Kerr,242
maintained that the child would someday learn that he was un-
wanted by his family because someone other than his parents
had paid for his rearing.243 Reasoning that our society has not
become so sophisticated as to ignore such an emotional trauma,
the court denied damages for the costs of raising the child. 244
In emphasizing the emotional effect that the parents' dam-
ages claim could have on the child, the Wilbur court failed to
recognize that such an effect is more likely to result not from an
award of rearing costs, but from the litigation process leading to
such an award and the child's ultimate discovery of the suit.
Furthermore, a resolution of this problem is better left to the
individual parents than to the courts.
Citing Wilbur, the Burke court stated bluntly:
We are... unimpressed with the reasoning that child-rearing ex-
penses should not be allowed because some day the child could be
adversely affected by learning that he or she was unwanted and
that someone else had paid for the expense of rearing the child.
240. See infra notes 241-314 and accompanying text (discussing these
rationales).
241. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); see also supra notes 114-
26 and accompanying text (discussing Wilbur).
242. 628 S.W.2d at 570.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 571. The rationale of the Wilbur court has not gained widespread
acceptance. One court, in recognizing the concern raised by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, suggested the use of a pseudonym in place of the parents' name in
the case style. See Anonymous v. Hosp., 366 A.2d 204 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980)
(asserting that the use of the pseudonym would lessen the chance of personal pub-
licity for the plaintiff parents and the wrongful birth infant). Attempting to rebut
the "emotional bastard" contention, a Florida court suggested that the child should
not be thought of as unloved, but merely as unplanned. See Jackson v. Anderson,
230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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Courts expressing concern about the effect on the child neverthe-
less allow the parents to recover certain direct expenses from the
negligent physician without expressing concern about harm to the
child when the child learns that he or she was unwanted. 245
Additionally, the Burke court maintained that "it is for the par-
ents, not the courts, to decide whether a lawsuit would ad-
versely affect the child and should not be maintained. '246
Since it is generally accepted that the parents and not the
courts are responsible for the care and well being of their chil-
dren,247 the parents should be allowed to decide whether the po-
tential emotional impact on a child warrants refraining from
bringing a wrongful birth action. If the plaintiffs originally de-
cided not to rear another child based on financial circum-
stances, they may feel compelled to bring a wrongful birth suit
to financially secure the child's future, irrespective of the possi-
ble trauma it may cause. Therefore, the bare allegation that
there may be negative emotional effects on a child because his
parents were awarded rearing costs, rather than only medical
and hospital expenses, should not prove strong enough to per-
suade a court to insulate the defendant and deny plaintiffs a
proper recovery.
A second contention that is based on considerations of pub-
lic policy and is frequently employed by courts to deny rearing
costs is the "surrogate parent" argument, introduced by the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin in Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.2 48
The Wisconsin court decided that public policy does not permit
imposing the burden of child-rearing costs on physicians while
allowing the parents to retain the child.249 The court asserted
that while the intangible benefits of raising a child would re-
main with the parents, 250 every financial cost or detriment
would be shifted to the defendant physician. 251 Thus, the Wis-
245. Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1990) (citation omitted).
246. Id. at 5.
247. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
248. 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974). For a further discussion of Rieck, see supra
notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
249. Rieck, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
250. Id. at 245-46 (explaining that intangible benefits include the child's smile
and pride in the child's achievements).
251. Id. at 245 (defining financial costs or detriments as food, clothing and
education).
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consin court concluded that such a result would place an unrea-
sonable burden on physicians. 252
The Rieck court's reasoning is unsound for two reasons.
First, without acknowledging the plaintiffs interest in seeking
to avoid having another child, it is impossible to determine the
extent of the injury that he or she has suffered as a result of the
birth. Consequently, it is irresponsible for a court to claim that
plaintiffs damages are unreasonable. Secondly, if the parents
conclude that it is in the best interests of the child to raise him
with money obtained through a wrongful birth suit, this deci-
sion should be upheld25 3 regardless of any negative connotations
that could arise from arbitrarily placing the title of "surrogate
parent" on the physician. 25 4
Finally, courts have held that awarding rearing costs is un-
just because such a recovery is out of proportion to the physi-
cian's culpability. 255 This position is untenable under the
fundamental concept of causation in tort law.256 When a woman
252. Id.
253. See infra note 300 and accompanying text for an expansion of this
argument.
254. Rieck, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
255. In Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (App. Div. 1980), an action
against a physician based upon a negligently performed vasectomy, the Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, denied plaintiffs damages for the normal
expenses of rearing and educating a healthy but unwanted child. The court rea-
soned that exposure to such damages could lead to substantial verdicts against
which potential defendants cannot readily insure themselves. Id.
256. The principle of causation in tort law can be broken down into two com-
ponents-the cause-in-fact and the legal, or proximate, cause. First, the court
must find that there is a causal connection between the claimed injury and the
negligence. See Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982). If it can be proven
that "but for" the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff would not have suffered
injury, then the initial inquiry of causation is satisfied. For example, in Naccash,
Mrs. Burger clearly established that but for the negligence of Dr. Naccash, she
would have terminated her pregnancy and avoided the painful experience of bring-
ing a child affected with an incurable genetic disease into the world. Id. However,
tort law dictates that although the breach of duty may be the cause-in-fact of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff, liability will not be imposed unless the breach is
also the proximate cause of the harm. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 41,
at 263-64.
In essence, the question of proximate cause is whether a court, realizing that
there is a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs
injury, is willing to hold the defendant legally responsible for the harm that was
suffered. Id. Whether disguised under such terms as "foreseeable," as in Naccash,
"direct or indirect," also as in Naccash, or "natural and probable" consequences, as
in Speck, proximate cause is a vehicle by which the court can determine the defen-
45
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undergoes surgery for sterilization or abortion, she does so be-
cause she desires not to give birth to another child. If the opera-
tion is negligently performed and the mother does give birth,
then she must prove that the physician's negligence was the
cause of the birth. Assuming she does so, the physician should
be held liable for all proximate consequences of his tort. Courts
that have disallowed the plaintiff parents' costs for rearing have
overlooked the fact that the foreseeable consequences of the
physician's negligence do not stop at the maternity ward door.
B. Surmounting the Barrier of Damage Speculation
The problem of speculative damages is another issue that
has concerned courts in deciding cases of wrongful birth. While
the arguments for denying parents the costs of rearing based on
public policy are often nebulous and incapable of legal justifica-
tion,257 it is a well established principle of damages that a plain-
tiff must not only establish the existence of an injury, but also
the amount of loss he has suffered. 258 In wrongful birth cases
where damages are clearly established, some courts have de-
nied recovery because it is too difficult to measure damages. 259
dant's liability based on concepts of public policy and justice. For example, the
Wisconsin court's comments in Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242,
244 (Wis. 1974) and the argument advanced by the defendant physician in Ochs v.
Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982). However, the proximate cause argument has
also been carried to extremes. For example, in Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460,
464 (S.D. W. Va. 1967), the defendant physician unsuccessfully claimed that the
act of sexual intercourse was an "intervening cause" that should cut off his
liability.
The cause of action for wrongful birth has been denied on the basis of proxi-
mate cause. In Rieck, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that "even where the
claim of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on
the grounds of public policy." 219 N.W.2d at 244. The court's list of reasons for
denying a claim based on policy included the injury being too disproportionate to
the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor, and the problem of placing an unreason-
able burden upon physicians in allowing recovery. Id. Similar reasons led the Su-
preme Court of Delaware in Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), to deny
the cause of action, while a federal court in Texas refused the claim because it was
simply not foreseeable that a "pregnancy may result in the birthing of an abnormal
child." See also LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118, 121 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
257. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ark. 1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
258. DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 33 (1973).
259. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (holding that plain-
tiff could not recover from surgeon for alleged improper performance of steriliza-
tion operation because it was impossible to measure the value of human life);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967) (denying damages to parents of an
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Adhering to this view, courts have misconstrued and mis-
applied the rule of certainty in the context of wrongful birth.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as
requiring only proof of damages from which the jury may infer a
just and reasonable estimate of the extent of damage.260 Al-
though an estimate of the costs of rearing a child will often in-
volve more complicated and sophisticated methods of proof than
those used to determine medical and hospital costs, 261 many
courts have properly concluded that this difficulty is not tanta-
mount to denying the plaintiff the opportunity to present evi-
dence of the expected costs. 262
In Berman v. Allan, for instance, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated that "to deny [the plaintiffs] redress for their
injuries merely because damages cannot be measured with pre-
cise exactitude would constitute a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice."263 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in
Ochs v. Borelli,264 properly met the question of certainty in stat-
ing that it has "no basis for distinguishing this case from other
tort cases in which the trier of fact fixes damages for wrongful
death or for loss of consortium."265 In correctly formulating and
accurately applying the rule of certainty, the Ochs court 266 fol-
lowed the majority of jurisdictions that allow claims for wrong-
ful birth.267
impaired child because calculation of damages was impossible); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (denying damages in a negligent sterilization
wrongful birth case, partly because it was impossible to properly calculating dam-
ages for future expenditures on behalf of the child).
260. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
261. The court must employ methods including statistics on the general costs
of raising a child in the plaintiffs geographical area, the income level of the par-
ents, and the amount of money spent or being spent by the parents on other chil-
dren in the family.
262. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
263. 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979) (addressing the issue of emotional damages).
264. 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982).
265. Id. at 886 (citation omitted).
266. The Wilbur court also briefly mentioned the problem of speculation. 628
S.W.2d 568, 570. However, that issue was not determinative in its ruling. The
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Virginia courts did not raise the issue of
speculation.
267. See, e.g., Troppi, 187 N.W.2d 511.
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In Marciniak v. Lundborg,268 the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin definitively stated that the problem of damage speculation
in wrongful birth cases is not an issue. The "[d]efendants ...
argue that child rearing costs are too speculative and that it is
impossible to establish with reasonable certainty the damages
to the parents. We do not agree . . .similar calculations are
routinely performed in countless other malpractice situa-
tions."269 The court continued by recognizing that "i] uries are
frequently called on to make far more complex damage assess-
ments in other tort cases" and "[plopulation studies are readily
available to provide figures for the costs of raising a child."270
The court ruled against the defendants with respect to this
claim. Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
in Burke v. Rivo,27 1 stated that the "determination of the antici-
pated costs of child-rearing is no more complicated or fanciful
than many calculations of future losses made every day in tort
cases."
2 7 2
It is clear, therefore, that the issue of a potentially specula-
tive damage calculation for the birth of a healthy, yet unplan-
ned or unwanted child merely is a futile attempt by negligent
physicians to avoid the consequences of their wrongdoing.
Thus, the malfeasant defendants turn to yet another potential
argument.
C. The Troublesome Issue of Damage Mitigation
The doctrine of damage mitigation generally has not been
applied to wrongful birth cases. 273 The courts that have recog-
nized a claim for wrongful birth274 have conformed to the major-
ity position by not analyzing whether the plaintiffs could have
limited their damages. The doctrine of damage mitigation re-
268. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
269. Id. at 245.
270. Id. at 246.
271. 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
272. Id. at 5. The court continued: "If a physician is negligent in caring for a
newborn child, damage calculations would be made concerning the newborn's
earning capacity and expected medial expenses over an entire lifetime. The ex-
penses of rearing a child are far more easily determined." Id.
273. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Troppi
v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
274. See cases cited supra note 213.
288 [Vol. 27:241
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/3
2007] WRONGFUL BIRTH 289
quires a plaintiff to take reasonable measures to minimize the
financial consequences of the defendant's negligence.27 5 Also
known as the rule of avoidable consequences, 276 it denies recov-
ery for any damages that could have been reasonably avoided
after the tortfeasor committed the wrong.277 Application of this
rule to mitigation in wrongful birth claims would require that
the child be aborted or put up for adoption.278 If either abortion
or adoption were determined to be reasonable conduct, and the
plaintiff failed to employ such measures, recovery of damages
for the costs of rearing could be denied.279
Considering the zeal with which courts have applied other
rules of damages280 to protect the medical profession from the
financial burden of wrongful birth claims,21l it is anomalous
that these same courts have not required defendants to mitigate
their damages. In fact, it has generally been held, as a per se
rule of law, that such efforts on the part of the claimants are
unnecessary. 28 2
While courts purport to treat the wrongful birth action
within the framework of negligence, 28 3 they nevertheless de-
cline to apply the firmly established tort principle of damage
mitigation.28 4 In so doing, courts have increased the likelihood
275. DOBBS, supra note 258, § 3.7.
276. Id.
277. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 65, at 458. For a discussion of rea-
sonableness within the context of wrongful birth, see supra notes 273-76 and infra
notes 278-314.
278. See, e.g., Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974).
279. Id.
280. For a sampling of courts that have denied wrongful birth claims because
of the problem of speculation in calculating damages, see supra notes 257-72.
281. See supra notes 241-66 and accompanying text, discussing public policy
reasons promulgated by courts in denying wrongful birth claims.
282. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Ochs v. Borrelli,
445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
283. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
284. The Pennsylvania and Virginia courts, in Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d
110 (Pa. 1981), and Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982), were not guilty
of neglecting the mitigation doctrine. In both cases, the plaintiff mothers had at-
tempted to terminate their pregnancies. For a discussion for both these cases, see
supra notes 159-81 and accompanying text. The Arkansas and Connecticut courts,
in Wilbur, 628 S.W.2d 568, and Ochs, 445 A.2d 883, only briefly mentioned the
question of mitigation. Both opined that, as a matter of law, abortion or adoption
were not reasonable conduct and, therefore, not required of the plaintiff. The New
Hampshire court, in Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982), made no ref-
erence to the mitigation doctrine.
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of imposing an unjust ruling on the parties to the wrongful birth
suit. As opposed to the other situations in which the courts
have failed to apply or have misapplied common law rules of
damages in the wrongful birth setting,285 the error here is not
the possible creation of a windfall to the defendant physician
through a denial of rearing costs, 28 6 but the chance of errone-
ously compensating the plaintiff parents with those costs.
In not deferring these questions to the jury, the courts that
have dealt with wrongful birth claims have also, arguably, con-
travened two principles of law. First, it is a well established
postulate of tort law that the negligent tortfeasor takes his vic-
tim as he finds him.28 7 That is, the victim's individual nature
will often determine the extent of the wrongdoer's liability. Sec-
ond, the United States Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, estab-
lished an unqualified right for any woman to obtain an abortion
during the first trimester of her pregnancy. 288 While courts
have been willing to use this holding for purposes of finding in-
jury in wrongful birth cases, 28 9 it has been ignored with respect
to mitigation. This result has been justified on the basis of an
overriding public policy and on the reasonableness corollary to
the rule of mitigation.
The primary policy argument against mitigating damages
through abortion is premised on the public controversy sur-
rounding that issue. For many people, abortion involves a
profound moral and religious question. For instance, the Court
of Claims of New York, in Rivera v. State,290 held that a "rule of
285. Situations where the court has misapplied common law rules of damages
are discussed in supra notes 241-56 and accompanying text and infra notes 315-32
and accompanying text.
286. For example, the fear of such a windfall led the New Hampshire court in
Kingsbury to deny the plaintiff parents the costs of rearing. See supra notes 111-
13 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale in Kingsbury).
287. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
288. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
289. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
290. 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (awarding plaintiffs damages for the an-
ticipated cost of rearing an unplanned child, offset by any benefits conferred to
them by the birth, as a result of a negligent sterilization wrongful birth).
Whether this position is constitutionally sound is arguable, because it is not
certain that a state court's disposition of a wrongful birth claim constitutes state
action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. Although, the Supreme Court declared, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), that "the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capaci-
290 [Vol. 27:241
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law which required claimant to have an abortion would consti-
tute an invasion of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious
kind."291 The court asserted that a decision regarding abortion
is for the individual to make based upon her own religious, phil-
osophical or moral principles; while abortion is a right, it is not
an obligation.292 Based on these considerations, the Rivera
court concluded that the plaintiffs failure to obtain an abortion
would not affect her cause of action.293 The Supreme Court of
Michigan, in Troppi v. Scarf,294 reached the same result and
held that the jury could not "take into consideration the fact
that the plaintiffs might have aborted the child or placed the
child for adoption. '295
Additionally, Roe (and its progeny) has been construed as to
not only allow abortion (under its requirements), but to prohibit
any governmental interference with a woman's right to choose
not to have an abortion. In Arnold v. Board of Education, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit opined
that: "It is freedom in the decision-making process which re-
ceives constitutional protection. Resolution of the childbearing
decision embraces two alternatives, those of aborting the child
or carrying the child to term. Both alternatives enjoy constitu-
tional protection from unwarranted governmental interfer-
ence."296 The court continued by stating that there simply is no
difference between choosing to abort a fetus or to carry it; both
choices are legal under the constitutional right of privacy. 297
Although adoption does not raise the same religious, philo-
sophical or moral questions inherent in the problem of abortion,
ties is to be regarded as action of the State," the court was dealing with a racially
discriminatory covenant and has been criticized as being overbroad. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473 (1962). Therefore, until a definitive ruling is made on the issue, it is possible
that a state court could require the trier of fact to reduce the plaintiffs damage
award on the basis of failure to mitigate, without violating the plaintiffs constitu-
tional right to privacy. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
291. 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
295. Id. at 520.
296. 880 F.2d 305, 311 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
297. Id.
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courts have treated the two options identically.29 In Troppi,
the Michigan court stated that a determination of reasonable-
ness is actually a determination of that which is in the child's
best interests. 299 The court held that the law had "long recog-
nized the desirability of permitting a child to be reared by his
natural parents. '300 Thus, the Michigan court concluded that
the parents may have reasonably believed that the child would
be damaged by the "hazards of adoption," and as a "matter of
personal conscience and choice" wished to keep their once un-
wanted child.301
The legal rationale most frequently asserted for these con-
clusions is that the procedures of abortion or adoption are not
within the scope of reasonable conduct.30 2 Quoting from McCor-
mick on Damages,30 3 an Illinois appeallate court, in Cockrum v.
Baumgartner,3 4 declared:
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged
must incur in order to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such
that under all the circumstances a reasonable man might well de-
cline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no disability against
recovering full damages. 30 5
The Illinois court concluded that as a matter of law, no mother
can be reasonably asked to abort or to place her child up for
adoption. 30 6
298. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982).
299. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
300. Id. at 520 n.12 (citing In re Ernst, 129 N.W.2d 430, 443-48 (Mich. 1964);
In re Mathers, 124 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Mich. 1963); Herbstman v. Shiftan, 108
N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. 1961); In re Mark T., 154 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967)).
In further substantiating its position, the Troppi court posited that "[a] child
will not be taken from his mother without her consent, without regard to whether
the child was conceived or born in wedlock, unless the child is neglected or the
mother is unfit. The mother's right to keep the child is not dependent on whether
she desired the conception of the child." 187 N.W.2d at 520.
301. Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
302. Id.
303. MCCORMICK, supra note 229, § 35, at 133.
304. 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
305. Id. at 971 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 35, at 133
(1935)).
306. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was of the same mindset
in Marciniak v. Lundborg.307 In considering the issue, it stated
that the defendants' refusal "to abort the unplanned child or
give it up for adoption should be considered as a failure ... to
mitigate ... damages. The rules requiring mitigation of dam-
ages require only that reasonable measures be taken" and it is
not "reasonable to expect parents to essentially choose between
the child and the cause of action."308 Recognizing that such a
decision would be a "Hobson's choice," the court declined to ap-
ply the mitigation principle in wrongful birth cases for fear that
it would be involving itself in "highly personal matters [that]
involve deeply held moral or religious convictions." 30 9
It could be argued that while abortion or adoption may be
unreasonable conduct for many parents, as a matter of fact,
they should not be considered, as a matter of law, unreasonable
for all parents. Therefore, since the decision whether to have an
abortion is a legal right, and the plaintiff must take the victim
as he finds him, the trier of fact in a wrongful birth suit should
be allowed to determine on a case by case basis what is to be
considered reasonable conduct regarding mitigation of dam-
ages. If the plaintiffs could not justify their failure to mitigate,
the court would reduce their recovery. Such a determination
would also serve the purpose of preventing fraudulent claims
for rearing costs. 310 For example, in Hartke v. McKelway,311 the
court determined that the plaintiffs decision to keep a child
born following a negligent sterilization was not the result of
307. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
308. Id. at 247.
309. Id.; see also Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1990) ("firmly re-
ject[ing] any suggestion that the availability of abortion or of adoption furnishes a
basis for limiting damages payable by a physician but for whose negligence the
child would not have been conceived.").
310. The problem of fraudulent claims, although not raised generally by the
courts hearing wrongful birth claims, is noted. With the goal of preventing fraudu-
lent claims, some courts have refused to award parents the costs of rearing. In
completely denying a cause of action for wrongful birth, a Wisconsin court objected
to the subjective and unprovable nature of a wrongful birth claim. Since the action
involves the pleading of a state of mind or intention, the court opined that the
"temptation would be great for parents, where a diagnosis of pregnancy was not
timely made, if not to invent an intent to prevent pregnancy, at least to deny any
possibility of change of mind or attitude before the action contemplated was
taken." Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Wis. 1974).
311. 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981).
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principled objections to abortion, since she had chosen to termi-
nate her previous pregnancy.312 It, therefore, denied the plain-
tiffs claim of damages for raising the wrongfully born child. 313
However, in balancing the competing values involved in the
issue of damage mitigation for wrongful birth, the courts have
weighed the question of reasonableness heavily and determined
that it is per se unreasonable to hold parents responsible for
choosing not to abort the unplanned fetus, or, once born, place
the child up for adoption.314 By not holding parents to the rule
of mitigation, courts have increased the possibility of creating
windfall verdicts to the plaintiffs and presenting practitioners
in the medical profession with unreasonable financial burdens.
However, other, less controversial, arguments have been uti-
lized in seeking to avoid those consequences. The foremost ar-
guments that have been advanced to prevent windfalls and
limit liability are the theories of the overriding or offsetting
benefits of parenthood.
D. The Overriding or Offsetting Benefits of Parenting
In the earliest litigation over claims for wrongful birth, the
plaintiff parents were denied recovery based on the rationale
that the joys of parenthood far exceed any injury suffered from
the birth of a child.315 One court asserted that "[a]s reasonable
persons, the jury may well have concluded that appellants suf-
fered no damage in the birth of a normal, healthy child .... ,,316
The benefits that were considered to outweigh the possible in-
jury included the fun, joy and affection received in raising and
educating a child. 317
Over the years, many courts have employed the theory that
birth is a blessing which overrides any concurrent detriment.
In 1973, a Texas court of appeals held that the plaintiffs cause
of action for wrongful birth must fail because a price tag cannot
be placed on a "child's smile. '318 Similarly, in 1980, a Florida
312. Id. at 105.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
315. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934).
316. Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (Wash. 1964).
317. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
318. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
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court of appeals maintained that "[i]t is a matter of universally
shared emotion and sentiment that the intangible but all-im-
portant, incalculable but invaluable 'benefits' of parenthood far
outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens involved."319
Conversely, many courts have concluded that the wrongful
birth of a child inflicts financial injury on the parents.320 A Min-
nesota court declared that it would be "myopic to declare today
that those benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law. '321 How-
ever, the "overriding benefits theory" has not been completely
abandoned. Instead, the courts have given it new life in con-
junction with section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and have applied it to offset, rather than override a recovery for
wrongful birth.322 As defined in the Restatement, the rule
states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to
the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a
special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages to the extent that this is equitable. 323
The courts that have applied the offsetting benefits rule
have done so in two different ways. The first method of applica-
tion, the majority approach, was employed by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut in Ochs v. Borrelli.324 The court evaluated
the various benefits of parenthood and weighed them against
the financial detriments the plaintiffs suffered.325
The Connecticut court suggested that such benefits include
the "satisfaction, the fun, the joy, [and] the companionship...
319. Pub. Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (commenting that "[i]t is a rare but happy instance in which a specific judi-
cial decision can be based solely upon a reflection of one of the humane ideals
which form the foundation of our entire legal system. This, we believe, is just such
a case.").
320. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Burke v. Rivo, 551
N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
321. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175.
322. See cases cited supra note 320.
323. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1979).
324. 445 A.2d 883. Other cases which have employed this method include
Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1976) and Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d 169.
See supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text (discussing Ochs).
325. Ochs, 445 A.2d 883. The Ochs court, however, did not indicate how these
benefits were to be measured.
2007] 295
55
PACE LAW REVIEW
which the plaintiffis] as parents have had and will have in the
rearing of the child .... "326 The court went on to suggest that
these benefits will make economic expenditures worthwhile. 327
The Connecticut Supreme Court's balancing-of-interests
approach should be recognized as superior to the overriding
benefits theory or to a per se denial of child-rearing expenses,
because the injured parents are at least partially compensated
for the financial loss they have suffered as a result of the wrong-
ful birth. However, the Connecticut court's analysis is flawed in
that it ignores the "same interest" limitation of the Restate-
ment. A careful reading of section 920328 reveals that it is not
the plaintiff who must benefit through the defendant's tort in
order to fall within the parameters of the rule; rather, it is the
"interest" or purpose that the plaintiff was seeking to secure at
the time of the defendant's wrongdoing.
The interest sought to be protected by an individual who
seeks to avoid parenting a child is paramount because even if it
is argued that a child is always a blessing, that argument is
patently spurious when the potential parent does not want that
blessing. Therefore, applying the "off-setting" benefits limita-
tion to wrongful birth cases requires the courts to determine the
reasons why the potential parents attempted to avoid the birth
of a child.
Only two courts have applied the theory of offsetting bene-
fits by considering the purpose behind the plaintiffs attempt at
birth control. These cases illustrate the second approach to the
benefits rule. In Custodio v. Bauer, 29 a woman sought a sterili-
zation operation to preclude further aggravation of a bladder
and kidney condition. The defendant physician negligently per-
formed the operation and the woman eventually gave birth. Ap-
plying the benefits rule literally, the California court concluded
that the "interest" the plaintiff was seeking to protect was her
bladder and kidney condition. The court reasoned that if the
failure of the sterilization operation in any way benefited the
plaintiffs bladder and kidney condition, then the value of that
326. Id. at 886.
327. Id.
328. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
329. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
296 [Vol. 27:241
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/3
WRONGFUL BIRTH
benefit should be subtracted from the award. 330 In addition, the
court asserted that any benefits that the plaintiff received from
having the child, such as love and affection, have no relevance
to the interest she sought to protect and, therefore, should not
serve to offset the award. Since the plaintiffs damages were
not capable of being offset, the plaintiff was awarded full costs
for raising the child.331
Although the California Court of Appeals in Custodio cor-
rectly applied the rule of offsetting benefits in determining that
the intangible benefits of parenthood often are not coextensive
with the reason why a party submits to a sterilization proce-
dure, the court's holding nevertheless suffers from a flaw in rea-
soning. Specifically, in determining that the interest the
plaintiff sought to protect was her kidney and bladder condi-
tion, the court implicitly determined that the financial burden
of raising another child did not enter into the plaintiffs decision
to be sterilized. Regardless of the court's decision to award the
plaintiff rearing costs, it did not do so based on its findings re-
garding the benefits rule, but because of an unrelated ratio-
nale.332 Thus, the question still remains as to whether, in
holding the physician financially responsible for rearing, the
court has placed an undue financial burden on the physician or
created a windfall to the parents.
The Custodio court's application of section 920 of the Re-
statement is both logical and appropriate, yet it fails to provide
any justification for the purpose it purports to serve-that is,
allowing the plaintiff parents recovery for the costs of raising
the child. The California court's reasoning leaves open the op-
portunity to hold that, although the plaintiffs interest was not
benefited by the tortfeasor's wrong and hence damages cannot
be offset, rearing costs can be denied on other, yet to be articu-
lated, grounds.
In 1900, two courts made it clear that in their jurisdictions,
the purpose for which the plaintiff(s) sought recovery from the
330. Id. at 466.
331. Id. at 477.
332. The court based its holding on the family's need to "replenish [its] ex-
chequer so that the new arrival [would] not deprive the other members of the fam-
ily of what was planned as their just share of the family income." Id.
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negligent physician should override the "overriding" benefits
rule. 33
3
Substantially agreeing with the Ochs court, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Burke v. Rivo 334 concluded
that when parents decide to not procreate and the physician
who assists them with their decision negligently fails to grant
their objective, the misfeasor should be held responsible for the
costs resulting from the unwanted birth.335 In addressing the
issue of the benefits a child might bring to the parents, the
court stated that:
The judicial declaration that the joy and pride in raising a
child always outweigh any economic loss the parents may suf-
fer, thus precluding recovery for the cost of raising the child,
simply lacks verisimilitude, [and] [t]he very fact that a person
has sought medical intervention to prevent him or her from
having a child demonstrates that, for that person, the benefits
of parenthood did not outweigh the burdens, economic and oth-
erwise, of having a child.336
The court held that in addition to other damages recover-
able from the negligent physician (such as the cost of the unsuc-
cessful procedure), the tortfeasor is liable for the costs of
rearing the (at least initially) unwanted child, offset by "the
benefit, if any, the parents receive and will receive from having
their child."337
Thus, as did the Ochs court, the Burke court did not com-
pletely compensate the plaintiff parents for the financial bur-
den incurred as a direct and proximate result of the defendant
physician's negligence. Unfortunately, regardless of the eco-
nomic hardships suffered by the parents of an unplanned, but
healthy child, the parents continue to be deprived of full redress
for the consequences of the defendant's wrongdoing. 338
In contrast to the Connecticut court's decision in Ochs, and
the Massachusetts court's decision in Burke, the Supreme Court
333. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Marciniak v. Lundborg,
450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
334. 551 N.E.2d 1.
335. Id. (framing plaintiffs' cause of action as basic medical malpractice).
336. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
337. Id. at 6.
338. For a more logical approach to damage calculation, see infra notes 345-57
and accompanying text.
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of Wisconsin, in Marciniak v. Lundborg,339 posited that the "ap-
plication of the [benefits rule] would require the jury to place a
monetary value on the benefits that would accrue to the parents
as a result of the child being with them, and offset those bene-
fits against the interest that was harmed."340 Understanding
the true meaning of section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,341 the court continued:
"The Restatement places two limitations on the application
of the benefits rule. The first ... is that the circumstances to be
considered in mitigation must benefit the same interest that
was harmed by the defendant's tortious act. The second ... is
that the benefit can offset the damage only to the extent that it
is equitable."342
Ultimately, the court concluded that it would be inequita-
ble "to apply the benefit rule in the context of the tort of [wrong-
ful birth]" when the parents made a decision not to have a child
for the precise reason to avoid that benefit "that the parents
went to the physician in the first place."343 The court held that
"the costs of raising the child to the age of majority may not be
offset by the benefits conferred upon the parents by virtue of the
presence of the child in their lives."344
In its decisive and often emotional rationale, the court pro-
posed that "[w]hen parents make the decision to forego" the
birth of another child, especially for economic reasons, it would
be ridiculous to allow the tortfeasor to avoid the consequences of
his negligence, regardless of any potential economic benefits the
child might ultimately provide to the injured plaintiffs. 345
339. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990) (finding that although the actual cause of
action was couched in the term "negligent sterilization," the ultimate harm alleged
by the plaintiffs was a wrongful birth).
340. Id. at 248.
341. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
342. Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 248 (citations omitted). The court continued:
Section 920... specifically states that for a benefit to be considered in miti-
gation of damages it must be 'a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed.... ' Comments to section 920 demonstrate that the draft-
ers of the Restatement felt that the 'same interest' limitation contemplates a
narrow definition of interest.
Id.
343. Id. at 249.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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V. Ascertaining Just Compensation: A Suggested Approach
for Awarding Child-Rearing Costs
The soundest approach to resolving claims for rearing costs
in actions for wrongful birth is the methodology used by the
Custodio,346 Hartke,347 Burke348 and Marciniak349 courts in their
application or non-application of section 920 of the Restate-
ment. When faced with a wrongful birth claim, a trier of fact
should ascertain the purpose for which the plaintiff underwent
the medical procedure in question to prevent the birth of a
child. This determination will provide a court with the informa-
tion necessary to accurately divine the type and extent of injury
the plaintiff sustained as a result of the negligent physician's
action or inaction. Such information, combined with proper ap-
plication of both negligence and common law damage principles,
is essential to a just determination of questions of injury, culpa-
bility and liability in a wrongful birth action. Unfortunately,
many courts deciding the issue of wrongful birth have not real-
ized the judicial efficacy of this approach. Only seven courts
have specifically stated that the purpose for which the parents
who had a procedure to avoid the birth of an unplanned or un-
wanted child should be determinative (or at least considered) in
ascertaining the negligent doctor's monetary culpability.
In Custodio, the court did not look to purpose; it simply
stated that if the plaintiffs could prove that a sterilization pro-
cedure was negligently performed, and that the physician had
breached his duty to them, they could recover all damages prox-
imately caused by the defendant physician's negligence. 350
Writing with this broad brush, the Custodio court introduced
the understanding that wrongful birth is a simple cause of ac-
tion for negligence and that the rules for recovery of damages
for a defendant's negligence should not be altered simply be-
cause a child is born. Nevertheless, because the Custodio opin-
346. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
347. 526 F. Supp. 97 (D. D.C. 1981).
348. 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
349. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
350. It is noted, however, that under this reasoning, it is likely that the plain-
tiff in Custodio would not have been allowed to recover the costs of raising her
child, since the interest she was attempting to protect was her kidney and bladder
condition and not her financial security.
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ion was harshly criticized for potentially providing the plaintiff
parents a financial windfall as a result of awarding them costs
for raising a healthy child,351 later courts began to consider the
plaintiffs motivation in deciding to avoid giving birth to a
child.
In Hartke v. McKelway, 352 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia determined that the plaintiff sought
sterilization not for economic reasons, but because she had pre-
viously suffered an ectopic pregnancy and "feared for her life
should she become pregnant again. 3 53 In allowing her to re-
cover damages for the physical and mental anguish she suffered
as a result of the defendant physician's negligence and in deny-
ing her claim for rearing costs, the court stated: "There is no
evidence to support the view that she sought to avoid the ex-
penses of raising another child .... To allow her to recover...
the costs of raising this child would be to give her a windfall."354
Thus, by determining the purposes for which the plaintiff
sought the physician's services and awarding damages based
upon the injury that the plaintiff sought to avoid, the court was
able to dispose of the case without unduly burdening the negli-
gent physician or unjustly enriching the new mother.355
This reasoning is equally applicable to a case in which the
plaintiff proves to have undergone the medical procedure solely
for economic reasons. Aligning itself with the Hartke court re-
garding the purpose for which the parents employed the ulti-
mately negligent physician, the court in Burke held that when
the parents' desire to avoid the birth of a child was premised on
economic or financial reasons and not eugenic (avoidance of a
feared defect) reasons, the plaintiff parents should recover the
costs of rearing from the negligent physician. 356
However, when plaintiff parents attempt to avoid birth for
economic or financial reasons, the court does not have to use the
351. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
352. 526 F. Supp. 97 (D. D.C. 1981). The case was before the district court on
the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial. Id. at 99; see also supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
353. 526 F. Supp. at 105.
354. Id. The court also concluded that "[t]he case where sterilization is sought
for economic reasons is not before the Court." Id.
355. Id.
356. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
2007]
61
PACE LAW REVIEW
balancing-of-interests test employed in Burke.357 Although dili-
gent and correct in awarding rearing costs, the Burke court and
others that have preceded and followed its reasoning and con-
clusion have erroneously bowed to the fallacy that the birth of a
healthy child is always a blessed event. Courts that rule that
rearing costs are appropriate, but nevertheless adopt the off-
setting benefits rule of section 920 of the Restatement, are mis-
guided. Any court that treats wrongful birth causes of action
differently from any other cause of action for negligently in-
flicted harm deviates from the essential postulate of the law of
torts.
When a plaintiff parent proves that she avoided childbirth
purely for financial reasons, the court must recognize that the
question is not "whether a doctor should be forced 'to pay for the
satisfaction and joy and affection which normal parents would
ordinarily have in the rearing and education of a healthy child.'
The question is whether a negligent doctor should be held re-
sponsible for the consequences of his negligence."358 The only
court that has achieved total success in applying the common
law of torts to a cause of action for wrongful birth is Marciniak.
That court made it perfectly clear that the costs of raising the
child to the age of majority may not be offset by the benefits
conferred upon the parents by virtue of the presence of the child
in their lives. 359
If relevant at all, the intangible notions of satisfaction and
joy arguably awarded to the parents because of the birth of an
unplanned or unwanted child should be considered only by the
parents in offsetting their own disposition against having a
child, and not by a court. While a child's smile may ease the
burden of rearing, it does nothing to mitigate the financial ex-
penditures that necessarily will be made on the child's behalf.
Courts that have failed to realize the difference between
these values have done so erroneously. In completely denying
the costs of rearing, or in offsetting those costs when the plain-
tiff proves that the medical procedure was undergone for finan-
cial reasons, the courts have failed to fulfill their responsibility
357. See also Ochs v. Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982) (applying the same
reasoning as Burke earlier).
358. Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 129.
359. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
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of compensating the injured party in a negligence action and
have insulated members of the medical profession from liability
for the injuries negligent physicians have caused.
VI. Conclusion
The history of the cause of action for wrongful birth has
been replete with the non-application or misapplication of the
fundamentals of the tort for negligently inflicted harm. Even in
the jurisdictions that do recognize the validity of the tort of
wrongful birth, the courts have been incomprehensibly con-
flicted over the proper measurement of damages to the parents
of an unplanned or unwanted child based on a doctor's (or other
health-care provider's) negligence that was the cause-in-fact of
the child's birth.
Today, there are five approaches courts take regarding the
birth of a child that was sought to be avoided by its parents.
First, no compensation is available at all for the tortfeasors'
malpractice, because the birth of a child is always a "blessed
event." Second, compensation for basic negligence with respect
to the physician's misfeasance is limited to the costs of the
botched procedure and possibly other elements such as pain and
suffering to the parent who underwent that procedure. Third,
some courts have held that if a child is born with an abnormal-
ity after an unsuccessful sterilization or abortion procedure, the
plaintiff parents deserve the full costs of rearing that child be-
cause of the doctor's negligence. Fourth, other courts have held
that even when a child is born healthy and without abnormali-
ties, rearing costs may be awarded to the parents of the child
they sought to avoid, but must be offset by the benefits the par-
ents will derive by having that child in their lives. Last, an ex-
tremely small minority of courts have held that full rearing
costs for an unplanned or unwanted child must be awarded if
the parents' purpose of avoiding the birth of a child was based
on financial reasons and not eugenic reasons.
The absurdity of these distinctions is palpable. Courts that
have held that the birth of a child is always a blessing are igno-
rant of the plaintiff parents' reasons for avoiding having the
child; often having the child is not a blessing, it is a burden.
Additionally, there is no justification for treating an award of
rearing costs differently for a healthy child and an unhealthy
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child; neither was wanted, which is why the parent underwent
the sterilization or abortion procedure in the first place. The
same is true with respect to the application of the offsetting
benefits rule: if the parents did not want a child, there is no
benefit, there is only a burden.
It is patently disingenuous to treat the tort of wrongful
birth differently from any other claim for holding a defendant
liable for the costs of his having negligently inflicted harm. The
interest sought to be protected by an individual who seeks to
avoid parenting a child is paramount because even if it is ar-
gued that a child is always a blessing, that argument is mani-
festly spurious when the potential parent does not want that
blessing.
While the inconsistency of these results may find support
in the frailty of human emotion and sympathy, the disposition
of wrongful birth claims should not be based on such standards.
Nor should it be guided by policy-ridden arguments that serve
to insulate negligent physicians from liability for the conse-
quences of their wrongdoing and often result in denying parents
just compensation for the injuries they have suffered. To prop-
erly effect the elementary premise of tort law and the purpose of
the damages remedy, courts hearing claims for wrongful birth
should shift their focus away from the health of the wrongfully
born child or the alleged benefits that the child may or may not
provide to the plaintiff parents who were attempting to avoid
that child's birth. Emphasis should be placed, instead, on the
interest the plaintiffs were seeking to protect in originally de-
ciding not to parent the child. Inquiring into the parents' moti-
vation for attempting sterilization or abortion will allow the
trier of fact to determine the extent of the plaintiffs injury and
thereby award them damages commensurate with that injury.
This method of analysis will serve to facilitate rather than frus-
trate the judiciary's goal of compensating the plaintiffs and de-
terring medical malpractice, while preventing the possibility of
creating windfall verdicts to either party.
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